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// MoorAI vs the field

MoorAI vs the field

One page, every comparison. MoorAI reviews your coding agents on the device, before anything reaches a model — content-free by default; full-fidelity capture is opt-in, turned on explicitly by an administrator. Here is its full shipped capability set against every vendor people evaluate it beside. MoorAI is ✓ on every row; each competitor is mapped from its published material. Open any column for the full per-vendor page.

AI detection and response (AI-DR). MoorAI is on-device AI-DR: ✓ it detects on the device and ✓ it prevents on the device, before the action runs. Most other AI-DR tools detect at the API or LLM layer, or from logs after the fact. Response on MoorAI means block, hold or coach on the device, with alerts in the console and export to your SIEM.

Where a product plugs in decides what it can see

Products in this category attach to the AI workflow at different points, and the attachment point sets hard limits on what each one observes and whether it can stop an action or only report it afterwards. Most of the differences in the table below come from this choice.

Plug-in point What it sees What it can’t see Stops the action before it runs?
Network proxy or API gatewaySASE/SSE-style inline inspection Requests that leave the device through the gateway: web AI chat, model API calls, uploads. One control point covers every app and device routed through it, with no per-app integration. Work that stays on the machine: a shell command, a file read, a local MCP server over stdio. Traffic that skips the route or can’t be decrypted. It sees the request, not the agent step that produced it. Yes for the outbound request. Any local action that came before the request has already happened.
Endpoint sensorEDR-style Every process, file write and network connection on the device, agents included, whether or not the agent cooperates. The agent’s context: the prompt, the retrieved text that steered it, the tool it chose. It records that a command ran, without the instruction behind it. Mostly after the fact, by killing or quarantining on behaviour. It rarely vetoes a single agent step with the prompt in view.
Agent hooks and local MCP gatewaythe agent’s own hook API plus an MCP proxy Each tool call and its arguments before it executes, the prompt, files and retrieved text entering the context, tool results coming back, and which MCP servers are connected and whether they changed. Agents with no hook API. Anything the agent does outside its tool interface. Agents that run on someone else’s servers. Yes, where the agent honours a deny from its hook. The MCP gateway can refuse a call from any client routed through it.
Browser extension What a user types, pastes or reads in the web AI chat apps it supports, in the browser where it is installed. Other browsers, desktop AI apps, CLI agents, direct API calls, and sites it has no support for. Yes, before the prompt is sent, on supported sites.
IDE and source-control scanningAppSec-style Code, dependencies, config and rules files once they are on disk or in a pull request, plus the change history. Runtime: the prompt, the command the agent ran, the data it sent out, and anything never committed. Before merge or deploy. On the laptop, the agent has already acted.

MoorAI plugs in at several of these points: a PreToolUse hook inside the agent, an MCP gateway in front of tool servers (a local stdio gateway and an HTTP gateway for remote servers), and a companion browser extension. For agents you build, a model proxy between the agent’s model SDK and the provider checks each tool call in the model’s response before the framework receives it, a moorai-serve sidecar answers the framework’s own checks, and an egress proxy enforces declared egress rules on the connections routed through it. Detection runs where the agent runs. That gives it the agent’s view of each step, and it leaves these gaps:

  • Agents other than Claude Code. Hook enforcement is validated end to end on Claude Code. On Codex and Copilot CLI the same checks block through each agent's pre-tool hook, but those adapters have not been run against the live agents. Claude Desktop is covered through the MCP gateway only.
  • SaaS and hosted agents. An agent running on a vendor’s infrastructure never passes through the device.
  • Device-level settings. It doesn’t assess OS configuration or other device posture, and it doesn’t map an agent’s credentials or file-system reach for you.
  • Network traffic. It is not a SASE platform. The egress proxy sees only connections routed through it, and it doesn’t decrypt TLS, so for HTTPS it judges host and port, not method or path. Egress from apps that aren’t routed through MoorAI isn’t inspected.

In the table below, a ✗ in a vendor column often means that vendor attaches somewhere else. A gateway product and MoorAI can both be the right answer for different parts of the same fleet.

✓ yes — unconfirmed ✗ no ◐ partial ← scroll the table →
MoorAI Airia Akto Aurascape Backslash Bifrost BigID Certiv Cranium Cycode CyCraft DeepKeep dope Endor Enkrypt Ent Forcepoint Harmonic HiddenLayer Holistic Kitecyber Lakera Levo Netskope NeuralTrust Noma Onyx Operant PointGuard Salt SentinelOne Singulr Straiker Trustwise Vijil Virtue Zenity
Content stays on the device ✓ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✓ ✗ ◐ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ — ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ — — ✗ ✗
Pre-install skill & MCP scan (before install) ✓ ◐ — — ◐ — — ✗ — ◐ — — — — ◐ — — ◐ — — — ◐ — ◐ ◐ — ◐ ◐ ◐ — ◐ ◐ — — — ◐ ◐
Only category · risk · keyed hash (plus login and hostname, pseudonymised on arrival) leave the device ✓ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ — ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ — ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ — — ✗ — ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ — ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ — — ✗ ✗
No tokenize-and-forward of content ✓ — — — — — — — — — — — ✗ — — — ✗ — — — — ✗ — ✗ — — — — — — — — — — — — —
Reviews prompts before they reach a model ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ — ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ — ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Reviews AI output, not just prompts ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ — ✗ — ✓ ✗ ✓ ✓ — — ✓ — ✓ — ✓ ✓ ✗ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ — ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ —
Scans what the agent writes — Write · Edit · WebFetch‡ ✓ — — — — — — ◐ — — — — — ◐ — — ◐ — ◐ — — — — ◐ ✓ ◐ — — ◐ — — — — — — ✓ ◐
On-device MCP tool-call gateway ✓ ✗ ✓ ✗ ✓ ◐ ✗ ✓ — ✓ — ◐ ✗ ◐ ◐ — ✗ — ◐ ◐ ✗ ✗ — ✗ ◐ ◐ — ✓ ◐ ✗ ◐ — ✗ — — ◐ ◐
MCP server allow-list at call time ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✗ — — ✓ — — ✗ — ✓ — — — — ◐ ✗ — ✓ — ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ — — — — — ◐ — ◐ —
Per-tool MCP argument rules ✓ ✓ — — ✓ — ✗ — — ◐ — — ✗ ✓ — — — — — — ✗ — ✓ — — ◐ — — — — — — — — ◐ — —
Inspects what a tool returns, not only its arguments‡ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ◐ ✓ — — — — — ✓ — ◐ ✓ — ✓ — ✓ — — ✓ ◐ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ◐ ✓ — ◐ — ✓ — ✓ ✓ ✓
Model-endpoint allow-list ✓ ✓ — ✓ — ✓ — — — — — — ✓ — — — ✓ — — — — — ✓ ✓ ◐ — — ✓ — — ✓ ◐ — — — — —
Shadow-AI agent discovery ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ — ✓ ✓ ✓ — ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ◐ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ — ◐ ✓ ✓ ✓
Browser + desktop AI-app discovery ✓ ◐ ✓ ✓ — ✓ — — ◐ — — — ✓ — — ✓ ✓ ✓ — ✓ ✓ ◐ — — — — ◐ — ✓ — ✓ ✓ — — ✓ ✓ ✓
AIBOM — live agent / model / MCP inventory ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ — — ✓ — ✓ ✓ — ◐ ◐ ✓ ◐ — — — ✓ ✓ ◐ — ✓ — ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ — ✓ — — ✓ ✓ ✓
Content-free data lineage / Event Flow ✓ — — ✗ — — — — — ✗ — — ✗ ✗ — — ✗ — — — ✗ ✗ — — — — — — — — ✗ — ✗ — — — —
Signed, tamper-evident decisions ✓ ✓ — ◐ — ◐ — — — — — — — — ◐ — ◐ — — — — — ◐ — — — — — ✓ — — ◐ — — ◐ — ◐
JIT elevation + entitlement envelope ✓ — ◐ — — — — ✓ — — — — — — — ✓ — — — — — — — — — — ✓ — ◐ — — ◐ — ◐ — ◐ —
Per-agent assurance score ✓ — ◐ — ◐ — ◐ ◐ — — — — — — — — — — — ◐ — ✓ ✓ ◐ ◐ ✓ ✓ ◐ ✓ ◐ ✓ ✓ — ◐ ✓ — ✓
Rules-file poisoning detection ✓ — — — ✓ — ✗ — ✓ — — — — ✓ ◐ — — — — — ✓ — — — — — — — — — ✓ — — — — — —
Instructions hidden in a skill (padding · HTML comments · concealment · reviewer-addressed text)◆ ✓ — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —
Agent writes to its own memory & instruction files, incl. copies, downloads and MCP writes◆ ✓ — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —
Files checked with a malware-scanning service before they reach the model◆ ✓ — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —
Reads of downloaded files gated by origin◆ ✓ — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —
Model files pinned by hash◆ ✓ — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —
Tool-call targets checked against the request◆ ✓ — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —
Lethal-trifecta / toxic-flow detection ✓ — — — ◐ — ✗ ◐ — — — — — — — — — — ◐ — — — — — — ✓ — — — — — — — — — ◐ ✓
Credential reads caught in pipelines · redirects · upload flags ✓ — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —
Break-glass / offline fail-closed ✓ — ◐ — — ◐ — ◐ — ◐ ◐ — ◐ ◐ ◐ — ◐ — — — ◐ — ◐ ◐ ◐ ✗ — — — — — — ◐ — ◐ — —
Prevents on built-in defaults — no policy authored‡ ✓ — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —
Natural-language policy authoring ✓ — ✓ — — — — ◐ — — ✓ — — — ✓ — ✓ — — — — — — — — — ✓ — — — — — — — — ✓ —
Compliance packs (OWASP / NIST / ISO / EU AI Act) ✓ ✓ ✓ ◐ ◐ — ◐ ✓ ✓ ◐ ◐ ◐ — — ✓ — — — ✓ ✓ — — — — ◐ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ — ✓ — ✓ — ✓ ✓
Published benchmark you can re-run yourself§ ✓ — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —
Model-refusal baseline separated from product effect§ ✓ — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —
Open source (MIT) ✓ — ◐ — ◐ ◐ — — ◐ ◐ ✗ — — ◐ ◐ ✗ — ◐ ◐ ◐ ✗ — — — ◐ ◐ — ◐ — — ◐ — ◐ — ◐ — ◐
No account / no platform to stand up ✓ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ — ✓ ◐ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ◐ ✗ ◐ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ — ✗ — ◐ ✗ ✗
Free to start ✓ — ◐ ✗ ✗ ◐ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ◐ ◐ ◐ ◐ ◐ — — ✗ ✗ ✗ ◐ ✓ ✗ — ◐ ✗ ✗ ◐ ◐ ◐ ◐ ✗ ✗ ✗ ◐ ✗ ✗
Browser GenAI prompt interception (ChatGPT / Claude / Gemini / Copilot / +) ✓ ◐ ✓ ✓ — ✓ ✗ ◐ — ✗ — — ✓ — — ✓ ✓ ✓ — ◐ ✓ ✗ — ✓ ◐ — ◐ — ◐ ✗ ✓ ✓ ✓ — — — —
Cross-platform endpoint — macOS · Windows · Linux† ✓ ◐ ✓ ✗ — ✓ ✗ ✓ — — — — ◐ — — ✓ ✓ ◐ — ✓ ✓ ✗ — ✓ ✓ ✓ — — ✓ ✗ — — ✗ — ◐ ✓ —
On-device model escalation (opt-in, content-free second opinion) ◐ — — — — — ◐ ✓ — — — — ◐ — — — ◐ ✓ — ◐ — ✓ — ◐ — ✗ — — — ◐ ✓ — ✓ — — — —
MDM fleet rollout (Intune / Jamf) ✓ ✓ ✓ — — ✓ — — — — — — — ✓ — — ◐ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ — ◐ ◐ ✓ ✓ ✓ — ✓ — ◐ — ✗ — — — —
Learn more ↓ The product → Sources ↓ Full page → Sources ↓ Full page → Full page → Full page → Full page → Sources ↓ Full page → Sources ↓ Full page → Full page → Full page → Full page → Full page → Full page → Full page → Full page → Full page → Full page → Full page → Sources ↓ Full page → Full page → Full page → Full page → Full page → Sources ↓ Full page → Full page → Sources ↓ Full page → Sources ↓ Sources ↓ Full page → Full page →

Every mark comes from the vendor’s own published material. For Airia, Akto, Aurascape, Cranium, CyCraft, DeepKeep, Enkrypt, HiddenLayer, Holistic, Levo, NeuralTrust, Noma, Onyx, PointGuard, Singulr, Trustwise, Vijil and Virtue, every row was read on 1 October 2026. For Backslash, Bifrost, BigID, Certiv, Cycode, dope, Endor, Ent, Forcepoint, Harmonic, Kitecyber, Lakera, Netskope, Operant, Salt, SentinelOne, Straiker and Zenity, eight rows were read on 1 October 2026 (pre-install scan, what the agent writes, what a tool returns, signed decisions, per-agent score, break-glass, open source and free to start); their other rows follow each vendor’s dedicated comparison page. Every ✓, ◐ and ✗ read on 1 October 2026 is listed with its quote in the sources below. — means we found nothing published, not that the capability is absent. The six rows marked ◆ were added for capabilities in MoorAI agents v1.34.1 (three rows, 24 October 2026) and v1.36.1 (three rows, 25 October 2026) and have not yet been read against any vendor’s material, so every vendor cell in them is —: not yet checked.

Sources: every ✓, ◐ and ✗ read on 1 October 2026, with the vendor’s own words

Airia

  • Content stays on the device: ✗ no (prompts routed through the Airia gateway). “Point them at the Airia AI Gateway and every prompt, completion, and tool call passes through Airia on the wire” airia.ai/docs/secure/securing-claude
  • Pre-install skill & MCP scan (before install): ◐ partial (MCP tool definitions only; informational). “Screen MCP tool definitions for hidden prompt injection before you add them to a Gateway or Deployment.” airia.ai/docs/mcp-servers/admin-controls/tool-scanning
  • Only category · risk · keyed hash (plus login and hostname, pseudonymised on arrival) leave the device: ✗ no (Compliance API path streams content). “Streams every prompt + response to Airia → SIEM / data lake.” airia.ai/docs/secure/securing-claude
  • Reviews prompts before they reach a model: ✓ yes. “Evaluate incoming prompts before they reach the model.” airia.com/ai-platform/guardrails
  • Reviews AI output, not just prompts: ✓ yes. “Inspect model outputs for sensitive data, bias, toxicity or unverified claims before they reach users or downstream systems.” airia.com/ai-platform/guardrails
  • On-device MCP tool-call gateway: ✗ no (MCP gateway is hosted, not on device). “Distribute the gateway URL into managed client configs via the same MDM file drop as §1 — one MCP entry replaces every local server.” airia.ai/docs/secure/securing-claude
  • MCP server allow-list at call time: ✓ yes. “tools/list calls return the admin-approved list saved in Airia, not the live tool list from the underlying server.” airia.ai/docs/mcp-servers/admin-controls/tool-scanning
  • Per-tool MCP argument rules: ✓ yes. “Validate tool inputs and execution parameters before actions are allowed to proceed.” airia.com/ai-platform/agent-constraints
  • Inspects what a tool returns, not only its arguments‡: ✓ yes. “At the context layer, Airia validates tool responses before they enter the agent’s context window.” airia.com/blog/indirect-prompt-injection-in-ai-agents-how-it-works-and-how-to-defend-against-it
  • Model-endpoint allow-list: ✓ yes. “every prompt, completion, and tool call passes through Airia on the wire: DLP, prompt-injection defense, model allowlist, budgets, audit.” airia.ai/docs/secure/securing-claude
  • Shadow-AI agent discovery: ✓ yes. “Airia identifies AI agents, LLM API calls, and MCP servers wherever they operate, then records them in a centralized inventory your team can govern.” airia.com/ai-platform/ai-discovery
  • Browser + desktop AI-app discovery: ◐ partial (browser signals; desktop apps not stated). “Airia connects to identity, network, SaaS, and browser signals to identify approved and unapproved AI usage” airia.com
  • AIBOM — live agent / model / MCP inventory: ✓ yes. “Inventory and track every AI agent across your organization, ensuring complete visibility and regulatory compliance.” airia.com/ai-platform/security
  • Signed, tamper-evident decisions: ✓ yes. “Each decision generates a signed, tamper-evident receipt that auditors can verify independently.” airia.com/blog/airia-achieves-aarm-conformance
  • Compliance packs (OWASP / NIST / ISO / EU AI Act): ✓ yes. “Automatically generate continuous governance documentation mapped to EU AI Act, NIST AI RMF, SR 11-7, HIPAA, ISO 42001, and SOC 2.” airia.com
  • No account / no platform to stand up: ✗ no (tenant key minted by the Airia platform). “Airia mints a tenant-scoped API key and bakes it into a.mobileconfig + airiad.pkg (macOS Apple Silicon today).” airia.ai/docs/secure/securing-claude
  • Browser GenAI prompt interception (ChatGPT / Claude / Gemini / Copilot / +): ◐ partial (domain-level block/warn; not prompt DLP). “The extension is domain-scoped — Block / Warn / Monitor / Redirect at the AI-service domain — plus optional request-body capture for post-hoc DLP.” airia.ai/docs/secure/securing-claude
  • Cross-platform endpoint — macOS · Windows · Linux†: ◐ partial (endpoint agent macOS Apple Silicon only). “Airia mints a tenant-scoped API key and bakes it into a.mobileconfig + airiad.pkg (macOS Apple Silicon today).” airia.ai/docs/secure/securing-claude
  • MDM fleet rollout (Intune / Jamf): ✓ yes. “export the managed profile —.mobileconfig (macOS) or.reg (Windows) — and push via Jamf / Intune / Group Policy” airia.ai/docs/secure/securing-claude

Akto

Aurascape

  • Content stays on the device: ✗ no (prompts inspected in the network AI Proxy). “Prompts, responses, and instructions are inspected and policy-enforced in real time through the AI Proxy.” aurascape.ai/secure-agentic-ai
  • Only category · risk · keyed hash (plus login and hostname, pseudonymised on arrival) leave the device: ✗ no (full conversation logs kept). “Full conversation logs, with RBAC, so you can understand exactly the prompts, responses, connections, and tool calls which contributed to policy flags or incidents.” aurascape.ai/coding-assistant-guardrails
  • Reviews prompts before they reach a model: ✓ yes. “Redact keys, tokens, and credentials in flight before an assistant or an unapproved model ever receives them.” aurascape.ai/coding-assistant-guardrails
  • Reviews AI output, not just prompts: ✓ yes. “Analyze every AI prompt and response to detect risks like phishing, social engineering, and malicious code generation—before they reach the user.” aurascape.ai/product
  • On-device MCP tool-call gateway: ✗ no (MCP gateway is a network URL prefix). “the gateway deploys in minutes by prepending one prefix to existing MCP server URLs” aurascape.ai/secure-agentic-ai
  • MCP server allow-list at call time: ✓ yes. “Allow marked, approved tools, and block unsanctioned tool calls routed through the gateway.” aurascape.ai/secure-agentic-ai
  • Inspects what a tool returns, not only its arguments‡: ✓ yes. “The same inline position catches prompt injection hidden in READMEs, docs, and MCP outputs” aurascape.ai/resources/blog/coding-assistant-guardrails-live-session
  • Model-endpoint allow-list: ✓ yes. “Allow only sanctioned seats, tiers, and models, so a personal or consumer license never stands in for the enterprise seat” aurascape.ai/coding-assistant-guardrails
  • Shadow-AI agent discovery: ✓ yes. “Find employee-used agents, agents embedded in SaaS, internally built agents, and shadow MCP servers connected without IT oversight.” aurascape.ai/secure-agentic-ai
  • Browser + desktop AI-app discovery: ✓ yes. “See every AI app, copilot, agent, and model in use” aurascape.ai/product
  • AIBOM — live agent / model / MCP inventory: ✓ yes. “Map every MCP server, tool connection, and data flow across your agentic environment so you always know what’s connected and where risk lives.” aurascape.ai/product
  • Content-free data lineage / Event Flow: ✗ no (lineage kept with conversation content). “Aurascape keeps an audit-ready record of agent conversations, tool calls, and data exchanges, with data lineage showing where information moved across systems.” aurascape.ai/secure-agentic-ai
  • Signed, tamper-evident decisions: ◐ partial (signs approved tool calls, not decision records). “it cryptographically signs approved tool calls and blocks unsigned ones” aurascape.ai/answers/ai-audit-trail
  • Compliance packs (OWASP / NIST / ISO / EU AI Act): ◐ partial (OWASP MCP Top 10 mapping only). “maps Aurascape’s coverage to the OWASP MCP Top 10” aurascape.ai/resources/data-sheet/zero-bypass-mcp-gateway-data-sheet
  • No account / no platform to stand up: ✗ no (network platform beside the SASE stack). “With Aurascape deployed alongside the existing secure access service edge (SASE) stack, steering only AI traffic” aurascape.ai/resources/blog/coding-assistant-guardrails-live-session
  • Free to start: ✗ no (no public pricing; demo-led). “Book a Demo” aurascape.ai/product
  • Browser GenAI prompt interception (ChatGPT / Claude / Gemini / Copilot / +): ✓ yes. “Visibility, risk analysis, and prompt + response decoding for thousands of AI apps” aurascape.ai/resources/news/aurascape-launches-from-stealth-with-50m-in-funding-and-an-ai-native-security-platform-to-enable-businesses-to-innovate-fearles
  • Cross-platform endpoint — macOS · Windows · Linux†: ✗ no (network-side; no endpoint agent). “With Aurascape deployed alongside the existing secure access service edge (SASE) stack, steering only AI traffic” aurascape.ai/resources/blog/coding-assistant-guardrails-live-session

Backslash Security

  • Pre-install skill & MCP scan (before install): ◐ partial (free lookup scanners for MCP servers and skills; not an install gate). “Backslash runs free scanners for both - the MCP Server Security Hub and the Skills Security Scanner” backslash.security/use-cases/supply-chain-security
  • Inspects what a tool returns, not only its arguments‡: ◐ partial (MCP proxy inspects agent-to-server traffic; responses not named). “Backslash’s MCP proxy sees and inspects communication between AI agents and MCP servers on the endpoint, blocking malicious instructions, risky tool calls, and policy violations” backslash.security/use-cases/mcp-security
  • Per-agent assurance score: ◐ partial (scores agents, MCP servers and skills; no per-agent assurance score). “Once you can see every agent, MCP server and Skill in use and score what each one carries” backslash.security/use-cases/shadow-ai
  • Open source (MIT): ◐ partial (Claw-Hunter detection scripts MIT; platform not published). “Distributed under the MIT License. see the LICENSE file for details.” github.com/backslash-security/Claw-Hunter
  • Free to start: ✗ no (no public pricing; demo-led; free assessment is vendor-run). “Book a Demo” backslash.security

Other rows: MoorAI vs Backslash Security →

Bifrost

  • Inspects what a tool returns, not only its arguments‡: ✓ yes. “After the tool returns; guardrails can inspect or redact its result” docs.getbifrost.ai/enterprise/guardrails
  • Signed, tamper-evident decisions: ◐ partial (HMAC-signed audit log of admin activity, not enforcement decisions). “Audit log entries can be signed with an HMAC key” docs.getbifrost.ai/enterprise/audit-logs
  • Break-glass / offline fail-closed: ◐ partial (fails closed without device trust; some domain rules fail open). “If the server cannot issue it, the agent fails closed instead of running with stale local material.” docs.getbifrost.ai/changelogs/edge-v0.4.0
  • Open source (MIT): ◐ partial (gateway Apache-2.0; guardrails Enterprise-only). “Open source under Apache 2.0 License.” getbifrost.ai/pricing
  • Free to start: ◐ partial (OSS gateway free; guardrails need Enterprise). “Free Forever OSS For developers, small teams, and self-managed deployments” getbifrost.ai/pricing

Other rows: MoorAI vs Bifrost →

BigID

  • Per-agent assurance score: ◐ partial (per-agent risk ranking; no score named). “Rank AI agent risk based on sensitive data exposure, permission severity, activity, ownership gaps, access paths, and business impact.” bigid.com/solutions/ai-agent-governance
  • Free to start: ✗ no (quote-only pricing). “Every quote is scoped to the data, AI assistants and agents you need to protect, and how you want to run BigID.” home.bigid.com/pricing

Other rows: MoorAI vs BigID →

Certiv

  • Pre-install skill & MCP scan (before install): ✗ no (pre-load MCP inventory is on its roadmap). “Certiv authorizes each MCP tool call against policy on the endpoint today; the pre-load MCP inventory is on the roadmap.” certiv.ai/claude-code
  • Scans what the agent writes — Write · Edit · WebFetch‡: ◐ partial (file edits checked against policy; content scan not stated). “every command, file edit, and MCP call is still checked against policy before it executes.” certiv.ai/claude-code
  • Per-agent assurance score: ◐ partial (risk scored per session, not per agent). “Analyze agent sessions, not isolated events, to understand intent, score risk continuously, and surface behavioral anomalies before they become incidents” certiv.ai/product
  • Break-glass / offline fail-closed: ◐ partial (policy keeps applying off-network; no break-glass found). “AI agent assurance stays in the execution path and keeps applying policy when the machine is off-network.” certiv.ai/compare/ai-agent-gateway
  • Free to start: ✗ no (no public pricing; demo-led). “book a demo and the team will walk through deployment, coverage, and pricing for your environment” certiv.ai

Other rows: MoorAI vs Certiv →

Cranium

Cycode

Other rows: MoorAI vs Cycode →

CyCraft

  • Content stays on the device: ✗ no (standard XecGuard is a cloud API). “Currently, the standard version of XecGuard is provided only as a Cloud API service.” community.cycraft.ai/xecguard/doc/docs/faq
  • Only category · risk · keyed hash (plus login and hostname, pseudonymised on arrival) leave the device: ✗ no (content sent to the API; attacks stored). “Only when malicious attacks (such as Prompt Attacks) are detected will the relevant content be temporarily stored in a de-identified format.” community.cycraft.ai/xecguard/doc/docs/intro/introduction
  • Reviews prompts before they reach a model: ✓ yes. “Scan input before it is sent to the LLM (blocks dangerous input).” community.cycraft.ai/xecguard/doc/docs/litellm/introduction
  • Reviews AI output, not just prompts: ✓ yes. “XecGuard can be deployed between User Input and Assistant Response to perform real-time security analysis on both user inputs and LLM responses.” community.cycraft.ai/xecguard/doc/docs/faq
  • Break-glass / offline fail-closed: ◐ partial (fail-closed when unreachable; no break-glass). “Blocks requests when XecGuard is unreachable (fail-closed).” community.cycraft.ai/xecguard/doc/docs/litellm/introduction
  • Natural-language policy authoring: ✓ yes. “Enables organizations to define custom Guardrail Rules in natural language based on their business or AI/Chatbot task requirements” community.cycraft.ai/xecguard/doc/docs/intro/introduction
  • Compliance packs (OWASP / NIST / ISO / EU AI Act): ◐ partial (compliance reports from red-team service). “Based on standards including OWASP, ISO, NIST, and financial regulatory guidelines, XecART delivers compliance reports through multi-round adversarial testing” cycraft.com/en/xecart
  • Open source (MIT): ✗ no (commercial licence; plugin licence not stated). “Commercial license plans such as Standard and Advanced are available for enterprise users only.” community.cycraft.ai/xecguard/doc/docs/faq
  • No account / no platform to stand up: ✗ no (needs a XecGuard licence token). “The Management Token is the primary API Key for using XecGuard services and also represents your License.” community.cycraft.ai/xecguard/doc/docs/quick-start/introduction
  • Free to start: ◐ partial (free Lite only for qualifying OSS projects). “Eligible open-source project maintainers and contributors will receive a free three-month XecGuard Lite API subscription at no cost” community.cycraft.ai/xecguard/doc/docs/faq

DeepKeep

dope.security

  • Break-glass / offline fail-closed: ◐ partial (optional Fail Close for its web lookups; off by default). “When this happens the dope.endpoint can be configured to switch Fail Close Mode ‘ON’ or ‘OFF.’” inflight.dope.security/dope.console/settings/endpoints
  • Free to start: ◐ partial (production trial). “dope offers an instant production trial. Free for as long as you need to test.” dope.security

Other rows: MoorAI vs dope.security →

Endor Labs

  • Scans what the agent writes — Write · Edit · WebFetch‡: ◐ partial (secrets check on file writes and edits). “By default a policy scans the content of file writes and edits.” docs.endorlabs.com/agent-governance/secure-coding
  • Inspects what a tool returns, not only its arguments‡: ◐ partial (opt-in secrets scan of files the agent reads). “Add FILE_OPERATION_READ to the policy’s file_operations list to also scan the files the agent reads.” docs.endorlabs.com/agent-governance/secure-coding
  • Break-glass / offline fail-closed: ◐ partial (pattern policies enforce from a local cache; malware check fails open). “The hook evaluates every event in that session against the cached snapshot, so pattern-based enforcement happens without a network round-trip.” docs.endorlabs.com/agent-governance/policies
  • Open source (MIT): ◐ partial (audit hook scripts Apache-2.0; platform paid). “README Apache-2.0 license” github.com/endorlabs/mdm-scripts
  • Free to start: ◐ partial (free tier is developer code scanning; agent governance priced). “AURI for Developers is a free tier designed for individual developers who want security feedback directly in their AI code editors.” endorlabs.com/pricing

Other rows: MoorAI vs Endor Labs →

Enkrypt AI

  • Content stays on the device: ✗ no (ClawPatrol sends changed content to Enkrypt Guardrails). “When a hash changes, it sends the content to Enkrypt AI Guardrails to classify the change as malicious or benign.” enkryptai.com/blog/your-openclaw-agent-is-more-exposed-than-you-think
  • Pre-install skill & MCP scan (before install): ◐ partial (skill packages only; MCP Scanner is a separate product). “Skill Sentinel uses multi-agent AI analysis to detect prompt injection, data exfiltration, command injection, malware, and other threats hiding in skill packages” github.com/enkryptai/skill-sentinel
  • Reviews prompts before they reach a model: ✓ yes. “Prompt boundary Input filtering and injection defense Policy-aware rewrite/block/escalate” enkryptai.com/product/agent-guardrails
  • Reviews AI output, not just prompts: ✓ yes. “Output boundary Enforce tone, safety, and disclosure rules” enkryptai.com/product/agent-guardrails
  • On-device MCP tool-call gateway: ◐ partial (local gateway; guardrails via Enkrypt API key). “secure-mcp-gateway install --client cursor” enkryptai.com/product/mcp-gateway
  • MCP server allow-list at call time: ✓ yes. “Allowlist/denylist tools, actions, domains; enforce least privilege” enkryptai.com/product/agent-guardrails
  • Inspects what a tool returns, not only its arguments‡: ✓ yes. “Validate tool responses before they return to the agent loop” enkryptai.com/product/mcp-gateway
  • AIBOM — live agent / model / MCP inventory: ◐ partial (MCP inventory through the scanner). “Inventory MCP servers, tools, and declared capabilities” enkryptai.com/product/mcp-scanner
  • Signed, tamper-evident decisions: ◐ partial (tamper-evident claim; no cryptographic mechanism stated). “100% automated, tamper-evident audit evidence.” enkryptai.com/blog/securing-enterprise-genai-deployments-netscaler-integration-with-enkrypt-ai
  • Rules-file poisoning detection: ◐ partial (OpenClaw workspace files only). “Continuously monitors the cognitive workspace files that define who the agent is” enkryptai.com/clawpatrol
  • Break-glass / offline fail-closed: ◐ partial (ClawPatrol only; no break-glass). “Configurable fail-open / fail-closed per deployment.” enkryptai.com/clawpatrol
  • Natural-language policy authoring: ✓ yes. “Converts natural language governance policy and regulation PDFs into structured controls you can enforce and audit.” enkryptai.com/product/agent-policy-engine
  • Compliance packs (OWASP / NIST / ISO / EU AI Act): ✓ yes. “OWASP, NIST, EU AI Act included as defaults” enkryptai.com/product/agent-policy-engine
  • Open source (MIT): ◐ partial (MCP Gateway, Skill Sentinel Apache-2.0; rest proprietary). “Apache-2.0 license” github.com/enkryptai/secure-mcp-gateway
  • No account / no platform to stand up: ◐ partial (Skill Sentinel standalone; guardrails need Enkrypt key). “Is Skill Sentinel open source? Yes. Skill Sentinel is fully open source on GitHub. Install with pip, export your API key, and start scanning.” enkryptai.com/solutions/secure-vibe-coding
  • Free to start: ◐ partial (free tier 50 credits/month; paid from $149). “$0/month Free forever Get Started 500 credits to start 50 credits/month” enkryptai.com/pricing

Ent

  • Open source (MIT): ✗ no (subscription terms call it proprietary software). “remotely access (i.e. on a SaaS basis) and/or use (as the case may be) the applicable Ent proprietary software product(s)” ent.ai/subscription

Other rows: MoorAI vs Ent →

Forcepoint

  • Scans what the agent writes — Write · Edit · WebFetch‡: ◐ partial (calls from agents to business apps; not coding-agent file writes). “No agent holds a direct credential, every call is inspected before it executes, and sensitive writes or deletes require human approval.” forcepoint.com/use-case/agentic-ai-security
  • Inspects what a tool returns, not only its arguments‡: ✓ yes. “No agent holds direct application credentials, every response is inspected at field level, and write or delete actions can be held for human approval.” forcepoint.com/ai-data-security
  • Signed, tamper-evident decisions: ◐ partial (immutable audit trail; no cryptographic mechanism stated). “Immutable audit trail on every agent-to-application transaction” forcepoint.com/use-case/agentic-ai-security
  • Break-glass / offline fail-closed: ◐ partial (endpoint keeps enforcing cached web policy; not AI-specific). “The agent blocks or allows web traffic based on web policies cached on the local endpoint.” help.forcepoint.com/endpoint/en-us/onlinehelp/guid-e79e617d-93a5-4aa9-9503-62ff37c64498.html

Other rows: MoorAI vs Forcepoint →

Harmonic Security

  • Pre-install skill & MCP scan (before install): ◐ partial (skills only, open-source regex scanner). “regex-based static analysis that flags known-malicious patterns before installation.” github.com/HarmonicSecurity/skill-scan-io
  • Open source (MIT): ◐ partial (claudit-sec audit tool Apache-2.0; platform not published). “License Apache License 2.0 — see LICENSE for details.” github.com/HarmonicSecurity/claudit-sec
  • Free to start: ✗ no (no public pricing; demo-led). “See the whole loop running live on your own AI traffic. Book a demo” harmonic.security

Other rows: MoorAI vs Harmonic Security →

HiddenLayer

Holistic AI

  • Content stays on the device: ◐ partial (Endlayer on-device; SDK path runs inline). “Every tier runs on the device and none of them runs a language model.” holisticai.com/endlayer
  • Reviews prompts before they reach a model: ✓ yes. “prompts are scored before they run, and secrets and personal data are warned on, redacted or blocked on the way out.” holisticai.com/endlayer
  • Reviews AI output, not just prompts: ✓ yes. “Validate AI outputs before they reach users” holisticai.com/guardian-agents
  • On-device MCP tool-call gateway: ◐ partial (Guardian tier; mechanism not described). “It sees one agent call another, an agent reach an MCP server, or a tool ask for a permission it was never granted” holisticai.com/endlayer
  • MCP server allow-list at call time: ◐ partial (tool allowlist in SDK; MCP hosts in policy). “which tools are approved, what an agent may do alone, which MCP hosts it may reach, and what may leave in a prompt.” holisticai.com/endlayer
  • Shadow-AI agent discovery: ✓ yes. “Shadow AI discovery without asking anyone.” holisticai.com/endlayer
  • Browser + desktop AI-app discovery: ✓ yes. “Every AI app, coding agent, local model, MCP server, account, credential and AI site appears on its own” holisticai.com/endlayer
  • AIBOM — live agent / model / MCP inventory: ✓ yes. “A searchable inventory of what is actually installed: AI apps, coding agents, local models, accounts, credentials and the MCP servers your fleet can reach.” holisticai.com/endlayer
  • Per-agent assurance score: ◐ partial (risk score per AI system; per-agent implied). “Calculates and continuously updates risk scores based on use case, model type, data sensitivity, deployment context, and regulatory exposure” holisticai.com/ai-risk-management
  • Compliance packs (OWASP / NIST / ISO / EU AI Act): ✓ yes. “Each rule is mapped to the clauses it satisfies, so the record you already produce is the record an assessor asks for.” holisticai.com/endlayer
  • Open source (MIT): ◐ partial (surface scanner Apache-2.0; Endlayer/SDK unlicensed). “Apache-2.0 license” github.com/holistic-ai/surface
  • No account / no platform to stand up: ◐ partial (surface scanner only; Endlayer needs console). “No account, no daemon, no telemetry.” github.com/holistic-ai/surface
  • Free to start: ✗ no (no public pricing; demo-led). “Book a demo See what AI is running in your organisation” holisticai.com/endlayer
  • Browser GenAI prompt interception (ChatGPT / Claude / Gemini / Copilot / +): ◐ partial (on-device TLS decode; browsers not named). “Decoder terminates TLS on the device, so a prompt is readable at the moment it is sent, and re-encrypts it before it goes anywhere.” holisticai.com/endlayer
  • Cross-platform endpoint — macOS · Windows · Linux†: ✓ yes. “macOS · Windows · Linux · cloud” holisticai.com/endlayer
  • On-device model escalation (opt-in, content-free second opinion): ◐ partial (on-device classifiers; no language model). “Sensor is deterministic; Decoder and Guardian add classifiers and act in the path on the machine itself.” holisticai.com/endlayer
  • MDM fleet rollout (Intune / Jamf): ✓ yes. “One shared secret and the same settings for every wave, through Intune, Jamf or SCCM.” holisticai.com/endlayer

Kitecyber

  • Break-glass / offline fail-closed: ◐ partial (on-device DLP enforcement continues offline; not AI-specific). “it enforces policy directly on the device, which means it still protects data when a laptop is offline or outside the corporate network.” kitecyber.com/best-dlp-solutions-vendors
  • Open source (MIT): ✗ no (EULA calls it proprietary software). “means the object code form of the Kitecyber proprietary software product(s) made available by Kitecyber under this Agreement” kitecyber.com/end-user-license-agreement
  • Free to start: ◐ partial (free trial; paid tiers). “Yes — you can start a free trial and deploy the agent in your own environment before you buy.” kitecyber.com/pricing

Other rows: MoorAI vs Kitecyber →

Lakera

Other rows: MoorAI vs Lakera →

Levo

  • Content stays on the device: ✗ no (employee AI traffic governed at a central gateway). “Levo’s AI Gateway applies AI-aware outbound controls and policy enforcement centrally, so sensitive data stays protected without disrupting workflows.” levo.ai/ai-security/ai-gateway
  • Reviews prompts before they reach a model: ✓ yes. “Inputs are normalized and scored for injection patterns.” levo.ai/ai-security/ai-attack-protection
  • Reviews AI output, not just prompts: ✓ yes. “Outputs are checked for policy violations.” levo.ai/ai-security/ai-attack-protection
  • MCP server allow-list at call time: ✓ yes. “Guardrails enforce tool and function allowlists, validate schemas, constrain parameters, and require least-privilege scopes.” levo.ai/ai-security/ai-attack-protection
  • Per-tool MCP argument rules: ✓ yes. “Levo enforces clear boundaries on what agents can do, which tools they can call, and what parameters they can pass, inline and in real time.” levo.ai/ai-security/ai-firewall
  • Inspects what a tool returns, not only its arguments‡: ◐ partial (only results the integrator submits as responses). “response for text arriving from elsewhere — a tool result, a fetched page, a file — which is the indirect prompt-injection case” docs.levo.ai/install-ai-gateway/ai-gateway-guardrail-api
  • Model-endpoint allow-list: ✓ yes. “allow approved destinations and block unapproved tools across AI chat and AI enabled SaaS” levo.ai/ai-security/ai-gateway
  • Shadow-AI agent discovery: ✓ yes. “Levo maps every internal and third-party AI asset in use: agents, APIs, LLMs and traces data flows in real time. This eliminates shadow AI” levo.ai/ai-security/ai-agent-security-platform
  • AIBOM — live agent / model / MCP inventory: ✓ yes. “Levo discovers and inventories APIs, AI agents, MCP servers, LLMs, and vector stores through eBPF-powered runtime visibility.” levo.ai
  • Signed, tamper-evident decisions: ◐ partial (immutable trails; signing not stated). “Rely on immutable trails of who, what, and where” levo.ai/ai-security/ai-monitoring-governance
  • Per-agent assurance score: ✓ yes. “Levo assigns runtime risk scores to each agent, model, and session based on sensitivity, anomalies, and drift” levo.ai/ai-security/ai-monitoring-governance
  • Break-glass / offline fail-closed: ◐ partial (fail-closed option, off by default). “LEVO_FAIL_MODE open (default) or closed. What to do when the gateway is unreachable, times out, or errors.” docs.levo.ai/install-ai-gateway/ai-gateway-guardrail-api
  • No account / no platform to stand up: ✗ no (needs Levo sensors and platform). “Levo provides governance in production by passively observing AI traffic with an eBPF sensor” levo.ai/ai-security/ai-monitoring-governance
  • Free to start: ✗ no (custom quote only). “We charge based on the number of API endpoints we secure, not on arbitrary usage metrics or traffic.” levo.ai/pricing
  • MDM fleet rollout (Intune / Jamf): ◐ partial (MCP discovery only). “MCP Discovery deploys via existing MDM and endpoint agents, requiring no proxies or rewrites.” levo.ai/ai-security/mcp-discovery

Netskope

  • Pre-install skill & MCP scan (before install): ◐ partial (public MCP servers rated before approval; skills not covered). “evaluate protocol versions, encryption types, authentication methods, and known risk attributes before approving any public MCP server for use in their agentic workflows” netskope.com/blog/securing-agentic-ai-before-it-scales-past-you
  • Scans what the agent writes — Write · Edit · WebFetch‡: ◐ partial (agent actions risk-categorised; not a content scan of writes). “Assign a risk level to each category of agent action, from source code changes to infrastructure provisioning” netskope.com/products/agent-action-control
  • Inspects what a tool returns, not only its arguments‡: ✓ yes. “inspecting prompts and the data from the tool calls before they reach inference” netskope.com/blog/netskope-integrates-real-time-agentless-dlp-for-claude-enterprise
  • Per-agent assurance score: ◐ partial (risk score per AI asset, not stated per agent). “Maintain an inventory of AI assets with risk scores, usage activity, threats, and any policy or guardrail violations to simplify compliance.” netskope.com/products/ai-command-center
  • Break-glass / offline fail-closed: ◐ partial (optional Netskope Client fail-close for steered traffic). “the Netskope Client prioritizes security by blocking traffic when a secure connection to the Netskope Cloud cannot be established or maintained for steered traffic” docs.netskope.com/en/netskope-client-support-in-cloud-firewall

Other rows: MoorAI vs Netskope →

NeuralTrust

  • Content stays on the device: ✗ no (hooks call TrustGuard POST /v1/evaluate). “Before an action runs, each hook calls POST /v1/evaluate with a collector tgk_… key.” docs.neuraltrust.ai/integrations/claude-code
  • Pre-install skill & MCP scan (before install): ◐ partial (MCP servers only; skills not covered). “Scan and test MCP server code for threats before attackers do.” neuraltrust.ai/mcp-scanner
  • Only category · risk · keyed hash (plus login and hostname, pseudonymised on arrival) leave the device: ✗ no (each event is sent to the evaluator). “maps each event to TrustGuard POST /v1/evaluate and returns allow / ask / deny.” github.com/NeuralTrust/trustguard-gemini-cli-plugin
  • Reviews prompts before they reach a model: ✓ yes. “Evaluates prompts, commands, tool calls, and tool results against an organization policy.” docs.neuraltrust.ai/integrations/claude-code
  • Reviews AI output, not just prompts: ✓ yes. “Protocol-typed policies run detection rules on every request and response.” neuraltrust.ai/ai-agent-security
  • Scans what the agent writes — Write · Edit · WebFetch‡: ✓ yes. “built-in tools such as write_file or web_fetch” docs.neuraltrust.ai/integrations/gemini-cli
  • On-device MCP tool-call gateway: ◐ partial (MCP via TrustGate gateway; verdict off-device). “MCP tool calls pass through the hooks like any other tool call, including tools served by TrustGate.” docs.neuraltrust.ai/integrations/github-copilot
  • MCP server allow-list at call time: ✓ yes. “Exposes the MCP registries and tools assigned to an application” docs.neuraltrust.ai/integrations/claude-code
  • Inspects what a tool returns, not only its arguments‡: ✓ yes. “Indirect prompt injection in MCP or tool output” docs.neuraltrust.ai/integrations/github-copilot
  • Model-endpoint allow-list: ◐ partial (model allowlists inside TrustGate only). “returns the union of native model ids the consumer can actually call (registries ∩ allowlists/policies ∩ provider capabilities)” github.com/NeuralTrust/TrustGate
  • Shadow-AI agent discovery: ✓ yes. “TrustLens surfaces every agent your employees interact with — whether it runs in the cloud, at the endpoint, or as a SaaS.” neuraltrust.ai/agent-posture-management
  • AIBOM — live agent / model / MCP inventory: ✓ yes. “Establish a real-time inventory of how AI operates across your organization.” neuraltrust.ai
  • Per-agent assurance score: ◐ partial (agents carry a risk score; source docs pages unpublished). “fires because a newly synced agent landed at risk score” docs.neuraltrust.ai/llms-full.txt
  • Break-glass / offline fail-closed: ◐ partial (fail-closed option; no break-glass). “open allows, closed denies when TrustGuard is unreachable” github.com/NeuralTrust/trustguard-gemini-cli-plugin
  • Compliance packs (OWASP / NIST / ISO / EU AI Act): ◐ partial (MCP scanner findings mapping only). “Map MCP and tool vulnerabilities to OWASP, MITRE, CWE, and AI-specific security frameworks to support audits and compliance programs.” neuraltrust.ai/mcp-scanner
  • Open source (MIT): ◐ partial (gateway and plugins Apache 2.0; TrustGuard closed). “The multi-protocol gateway engine (LLM, MCP, A2A routing, failover, retries, caching) and the control plane are open source under Apache 2.0.” github.com/NeuralTrust/TrustGate
  • No account / no platform to stand up: ✗ no (collector key and policy from the console). “Create its tgk_… key on Auth and assign the policy on Policies.” docs.neuraltrust.ai/integrations/claude-code
  • Free to start: ◐ partial (TrustGate free; enterprise pricing by quote). “Sign up free and start using TrustGate in minutes, no sales call needed.” neuraltrust.ai/ai-gateway
  • Browser GenAI prompt interception (ChatGPT / Claude / Gemini / Copilot / +): ◐ partial (browser collector; GenAI apps not named). “Collectors ingest agent traffic from gateways, SDKs, browsers, sidecars & log streams.” neuraltrust.ai/ai-agent-security
  • Cross-platform endpoint — macOS · Windows · Linux†: ✓ yes. “Linux: /etc/trustguard/gemini-cli.json Windows: %ProgramData%\TrustGuard\gemini-cli.json” github.com/NeuralTrust/trustguard-gemini-cli-plugin
  • MDM fleet rollout (Intune / Jamf): ✓ yes. “One org collector, MDM-deployed — every developer is protected without a NeuralTrust account.” github.com/NeuralTrust/trustguard-gemini-cli-plugin

Noma

Onyx

Operant AI

  • Pre-install skill & MCP scan (before install): ◐ partial (skills scored for reputation before they run; MCP servers scored on another page). “Every skill the CLI loads is surfaced, scored for reputation, and held against policy before it executes.” operant.ai/art-kubed/how-operant-endpoint-protector-secures-claude-code-the-claude-cli-and-claude-cowork
  • Inspects what a tool returns, not only its arguments‡: ◐ partial (MCP traffic analysed; tool responses not named). “Perform context-aware analysis of all data passed through MCP to detect tampering or malicious content” operant.ai/solutions/mcp-gateway
  • Per-agent assurance score: ◐ partial (trust scores named; per-agent not stated). “The system evaluates agent supply chain risks, assigns trust scores, and monitors tool execution sequences to detect anomalous behavior.” operant.ai/platform/agent-protector
  • Open source (MIT): ◐ partial (red-teaming scanner Apache-2.0; runtime platform not published). “Distributed under the Apache License 2.0” github.com/OperantAI/woodpecker
  • Free to start: ◐ partial (7-day trial). “We offer a free 7-day trial with Operant sandbox.” operant.ai/platform/pricing

Other rows: MoorAI vs Operant AI →

PointGuard AI

  • Pre-install skill & MCP scan (before install): ◐ partial (MCP server ratings; skills not covered). “By evaluating thousands of MCP servers and assigning transparent ratings, organizations can quickly assess trust, reduce AI supply chain risk, and adopt integrations with confidence.” pointguardai.com/mcp-security-gateway
  • Reviews prompts before they reach a model: ✓ yes. “Inspect prompts, responses, agent instructions, and MCP communications using PointGuard AI's High-Performance AI Guardrails.” pointguardai.com/agentic-endpoint-security
  • Reviews AI output, not just prompts: ✓ yes. “detecting malicious inputs, unsafe outputs, and policy violations before agents execute actions.” pointguardai.com
  • Scans what the agent writes — Write · Edit · WebFetch‡: ◐ partial (file modifications evaluated; content scan unstated). “Evaluate commands, API requests, and file modifications inside the cognitive loop before they execute.” pointguardai.com/use-cases/prevent-ai-threats-at-the-endpoint-ai-edr
  • On-device MCP tool-call gateway: ◐ partial (local MCP control; mechanism not described). “Govern enterprise resource access Control local MCP servers Reduce excessive AI privileges” pointguardai.com/agentic-endpoint-security
  • Inspects what a tool returns, not only its arguments‡: ✓ yes. “Detects sensitive data in prompts, responses, and tool outputs” pointguardai.com/agent-mission-control
  • Shadow-AI agent discovery: ✓ yes. “Continuous discovery identifies every AI project, model, dataset, agent, MCP server, and endpoint across your enterprise” pointguardai.com
  • Browser + desktop AI-app discovery: ✓ yes. “Continuously discover coding agents, AI browsers, desktop AI applications, local models, MCP servers, and agent frameworks operating across managed endpoints.” pointguardai.com/agentic-endpoint-security
  • AIBOM — live agent / model / MCP inventory: ✓ yes. “Build a centralized inventory of autonomous AI, identify Shadow Agents, and understand where agentic AI is being deployed throughout the organization.” pointguardai.com/agentic-endpoint-security
  • Signed, tamper-evident decisions: ✓ yes. “Every agent action is cryptographically attested and recorded in tamper-evident logs with full attribution.” pointguardai.com/agent-mission-control
  • JIT elevation + entitlement envelope: ◐ partial (assigned scope per agent; JIT not stated). “enforcing zero-trust authorization on each tool call against defined policies and assigned scope.” pointguardai.com/agent-mission-control
  • Per-agent assurance score: ✓ yes. “Dynamic behavioral trust scoring with automatic decay” pointguardai.com/agent-mission-control
  • Compliance packs (OWASP / NIST / ISO / EU AI Act): ✓ yes. “Built-in mappings to OWASP Top 10 for Agentic Applications, NIST AI-RMF, MITRE ATLAS, ISO 42001, and the EU AI Act” pointguardai.com/agent-mission-control
  • No account / no platform to stand up: ✗ no (policies managed in the PointGuard platform). “Centrally manage policies through the PointGuard AI platform while supporting lightweight local enforcement to meet performance and privacy requirements.” pointguardai.com/agentic-endpoint-security
  • Free to start: ◐ partial (free trial; free base tier for qualifying users). “Yes, we offer not only free trial but if you qualify, we also offer a base tier that is always free.” pointguardai.com/platform-overview
  • Browser GenAI prompt interception (ChatGPT / Claude / Gemini / Copilot / +): ◐ partial (browser plugin; prompt inspection unstated). “use a browser plugin for Shadow AI visibility and controls.” pointguardai.com/use-cases/prevent-ai-threats-at-the-endpoint-ai-edr
  • Cross-platform endpoint — macOS · Windows · Linux†: ✓ yes. “AI-EDR creates an enforceable runtime boundary for autonomous AI on managed macOS, Windows, and Linux endpoints.” pointguardai.com/use-cases/prevent-ai-threats-at-the-endpoint-ai-edr
  • MDM fleet rollout (Intune / Jamf): ✓ yes. “Deploy Agentic Endpoint Security using lightweight endpoint components managed through Microsoft Intune, Jamf, Kandji, and existing endpoint management platforms.” pointguardai.com/agentic-endpoint-security

Salt Security

  • Per-agent assurance score: ◐ partial (risk scoring across agents and MCP servers; no per-agent score stated). “Agentic Security Graph shows agents, MCP servers, technologies, and third-party vendors with risk scoring, posture gaps, and live traffic data in one correlated view” salt.security/blog/everyone-is-securing-the-wrong-layer-of-ai
  • Free to start: ◐ partial (Salt Code module only). “Get the FREE version” salt.security/code

Other rows: MoorAI vs Salt Security →

SentinelOne

Other rows: MoorAI vs SentinelOne →

Singulr AI

  • Content stays on the device: ✗ no (prompts and completions traced centrally). “Forensic traceability on every prompt and completion.” singulr.ai
  • Pre-install skill & MCP scan (before install): ◐ partial (MCP servers vetted with risk intelligence; skills not covered). “Vet and approve AI services, models, MCP servers, and agents using continuously updated intelligence from Singulr Pulse™.” singulr.ai/request-a-demo
  • Only category · risk · keyed hash (plus login and hostname, pseudonymised on arrival) leave the device: ✗ no (prompt and completion content retained). “Forensic prompt and completion traceability.” singulr.ai/products/runtime-security
  • Reviews prompts before they reach a model: ✓ yes. “Real-time detection and redaction of PII, PHI, and proprietary information before it reaches AI services” singulr.ai/products/ai-control-plane
  • Model-endpoint allow-list: ◐ partial (model allowlisting in approval workflows). “Model allowlisting and risk-based approval workflows.” singulr.ai/products/assurance-layer
  • Shadow-AI agent discovery: ✓ yes. “Find every AI system, agent, and embedded SaaS feature across all three AI vectors.” singulr.ai
  • Browser + desktop AI-app discovery: ✓ yes. “Continuous discovery and inventory AI services, agents, MCP servers, embedded AI, in-house applications, locally installed tools, and browser extensions.” singulr.ai/products/assurance-layer
  • AIBOM — live agent / model / MCP inventory: ✓ yes. “Agent Pulse gives you a live inventory of every agent, their risk score, and enforceable controls” singulr.ai/products/agent-pulse
  • Signed, tamper-evident decisions: ◐ partial (tamper-evident assurance proof; per-decision signing unstated). “the Singulr Assurance™ Layer generates longitudinal, tamper-evident proof that the whole system is held across every system, continuously.” singulr.ai/blog/runtime-ai-security-tool-vs-ai-control-plane
  • JIT elevation + entitlement envelope: ◐ partial (permission boundaries; no JIT elevation). “Agent permission boundaries are enforced at execution.” singulr.ai/products/runtime-control
  • Per-agent assurance score: ✓ yes. “The agent's risk score is updated in Singulr Pulse™.” singulr.ai/products/unified-ai-and-agentic-control-plane
  • Compliance packs (OWASP / NIST / ISO / EU AI Act): ✓ yes. “Regulatory compliance tracking (GDPR, CCPA, HIPPA, EU AI Act, NIST, OWASP 10 and other standards” singulr.ai/ai-governance-platform
  • Free to start: ✗ no (no public pricing; demo-led). “Get Demo →” singulr.ai
  • Browser GenAI prompt interception (ChatGPT / Claude / Gemini / Copilot / +): ✓ yes. “redact PII and PHI before exposure, control prompt injection, and bound agent permissions at the browser, the endpoint” singulr.ai

Straiker

  • Inspects what a tool returns, not only its arguments‡: ✓ yes. “At runtime, Straiker's MCP security tools enforce least privilege, validate inputs and outputs, monitor tool calls, and block unsafe actions” straiker.ai/solution/mcp-security
  • Break-glass / offline fail-closed: ◐ partial (Kong plugin option, off by default; no break-glass). “Reject traffic when Straiker cannot be reached.” github.com/straiker-ai/kong
  • Open source (MIT): ◐ partial (Kong plugin Apache-2.0; CLIs proprietary). “License Apache License 2.0. See LICENSE” github.com/straiker-ai/kong
  • Free to start: ✗ no (no public pricing; demo-led; free assessment is vendor-run). “Get a Demo” straiker.ai

Other rows: MoorAI vs Straiker →

Trustwise

Vijil

  • Reviews prompts before they reach a model: ✓ yes. “Input Guards check user requests before they reach your Agent.” docs.vijil.ai/owner-guide/protect-in-production/configuring-guardrails
  • Reviews AI output, not just prompts: ✓ yes. “Output Guards check Agent responses before they reach users.” docs.vijil.ai/owner-guide/protect-in-production/configuring-guardrails
  • Per-tool MCP argument rules: ◐ partial (tool-level access control, not argument rules). “It guards inputs and outputs with 20+ content detectors, enforces tool-level access control, attests agent and tool identity via SPIFFE” github.com/vijilAI/vijil-dome
  • Inspects what a tool returns, not only its arguments‡: ✓ yes. “Run a string returned by a tool through the output Guards before sending it to the model” docs.vijil.ai/developer-guide/protect/trust-runtime
  • Shadow-AI agent discovery: ✓ yes. “find every agent — sanctioned, shadow, and ungoverned — and fingerprints each one into a centralized registry.” vijil.ai/platform
  • Browser + desktop AI-app discovery: ✓ yes. “endpoints (Mac/Win/Linux), browser model use, and GitHub source code” vijil.ai/platform
  • AIBOM — live agent / model / MCP inventory: ✓ yes. “You get a complete, searchable agent inventory in minutes, not months of manual audits.” vijil.ai/platform
  • Signed, tamper-evident decisions: ◐ partial (signs tool manifests, not decisions). “The manifest signature protects this inventory from undetected modification.” docs.vijil.ai/developer-guide/protect/trust-runtime
  • Per-agent assurance score: ✓ yes. “Trust Score summarizes how an Agent performs across reliability, security, and safety, giving reviews evidence instead of opinions.” docs.vijil.ai
  • Break-glass / offline fail-closed: ◐ partial (fail-closed default only in enforce mode; no break-glass). “With Dome(enforce=True) , the default policy is fail_closed , so a Detector that cannot be reached blocks the request.” docs.vijil.ai/developer-guide/protect/using-guardrails
  • Open source (MIT): ◐ partial (Dome library Apache-2.0; platform closed). “Apache-2.0 license” github.com/vijilAI/vijil-dome
  • No account / no platform to stand up: ◐ partial (Dome library standalone; platform needs account). “all in a single pip-installable library that works with LangGraph, Google ADK, Strands, and any other agent framework.” github.com/vijilAI/vijil-dome
  • Free to start: ◐ partial (free trial; tiers unpublished). “Try Vijil for free” vijil.ai
  • Cross-platform endpoint — macOS · Windows · Linux†: ◐ partial (endpoint discovery only). “Scans five+ surfaces — Cloud VPC, on-prem (Kubernetes/VMware), endpoints (Mac/Win/Linux), browser model use, and GitHub source code” vijil.ai/platform

Virtue AI

Zenity

  • Pre-install skill & MCP scan (before install): ◐ partial (skills only, sandbox detonation). “AI Total makes that dynamic scan available to everyone, so teams can see what a skill does before allowing it into use.” zenity.io/research/ai-total
  • Scans what the agent writes — Write · Edit · WebFetch‡: ◐ partial (writes to restricted paths detected by path, not content). “Zenity detects writes to these paths that weren't initiated by an explicit developer action” zenity.io/blog/coding-agent-attack-surface
  • Inspects what a tool returns, not only its arguments‡: ✓ yes. “Detect and neutralize indirect prompt injection vectors across tool outputs, package metadata, web searches, and code comments” zenity.io/blog/product/from-ide-to-cli-securing-agentic-coding-assistants
  • Signed, tamper-evident decisions: ◐ partial (immutable audit trail; no cryptographic mechanism stated). “The audit trail is immutable and structured for SOC 2, ISO 27001, and GDPR.” zenity.io/use-cases/platform/claude-enterprise
  • Per-agent assurance score: ✓ yes. “These agents are scored for risk, evaluated for misconfigurations, and mapped to organizational policies.” zenity.io/blog/security/how-zenity-helps-enterprises-apply-ai-trism-to-ai-agents
  • Open source (MIT): ◐ partial (Cursor plugin MIT; reports to a Zenity tenant). “License MIT © Zenity” github.com/zenitysec/zenity-cursor-plugin
  • Free to start: ✗ no (no public pricing; demo-led). “Get unified observability, governance, and real-time threat protection over agents across your enterprise. Get a Demo” zenity.io

Other rows: MoorAI vs Zenity →

— = unconfirmed, not necessarily absent: it marks a capability the vendor does not clearly document. Competitor cells reflect each vendor's published material and match that vendor's dedicated comparison page where one exists. Every ✓, ◐ and ✗ read on 1 October 2026 is listed with its source under the table, and each of those quotes was checked on the vendor’s live site that day. Trademarks belong to their respective owners; this is an independent capability comparison, not an endorsement.

† Linux: MoorAI ships the agent (CLI, hooks and engine) as a .deb or tarball for amd64 and arm64; the desktop app, and its on-device OCR, runs on macOS and Windows.

‡ Enforcement scope. Hook-level enforcement is Claude Code. At the MCP layer enforcement is host-independent, but only 4 of 12 malicious actions natively traverse MCP, and Codex is not covered there. Inbound WebFetch and WebSearch content is scanned on the way back in, at the output stage — but that hook fires after the fetch, so the response is detected, not prevented; the prevention half of the row covers the outbound request. An enrolled device denies reverse shells and local credential egress on defaults; credential-file reads, destructive tool calls, unsanctioned installs and rogue model endpoints halt for sign-off. Unenrolled devices stay inert by design.

§ The benchmark. Graded against AMTSO's Guidelines for Testing of Agentic Security Products v1.0, on a locked held-out split never tuned against: 86.4% (38/44) at 100% precision, with 3.32% (20/602) false positives on benign traffic. Across the gap the model leaves — the attacks it does not refuse unaided — coverage is 95.2% against a local Llama 3 8B baseline (a marginal 45.5% of the corpus) and 75.0% against the deployed Claude Sonnet assistant (a marginal 13.6%), lower because a frontier assistant refuses more on its own; 1 of 44 attacks get past both layers against the 8B, 2 of 44 against Sonnet. The model-refusal baseline is what separates that from the model's own share. Without such a baseline, any published detection rate silently counts attacks the model would have refused on its own — which makes “what is your model-refusal baseline?” a fair question to put to every vendor on this page, including this one. Method, data and re-run instructions are ungated: testing methodology →

§§ Run it yourself. The corpora and the scoring harness are published standalone under Apache-2.0 as the Agentic Security Benchmark — 299 attack samples and 878 benign, 404 of them hard negatives, across five AMTSO attack vectors, with zero dependencies and no model in the loop. Any vendor on this page can score their own product on the same samples and publish the result; scored runs are on the leaderboard. Read those runs separately from the figures above: that harness is model-free by design, so its recall numbers are raw detection rates with no model-refusal baseline subtracted and are not comparable with the gap-coverage figure in the note above. AMTSO has not reviewed, certified or endorsed the benchmark or any result in it.

MoorAI compared with each vendor: questions

The questions buyers ask about MoorAI next to each vendor above, answered from that vendor’s published material. Open a vendor to read its answers.

dope.security

How is MoorAI different from dope.security?

Both run on the endpoint, but they intercept at different layers. dope.security is a fly-direct Secure Web Gateway: SSL inspection, URL filtering, Cloud App Controls and its Dopamine DLP all run on the device instead of backhauling to a cloud proxy, which gives broad coverage of any app that speaks HTTPS. That web-traffic TLS inspection is shipping and is a real strength MoorAI does not match. MoorAI hooks the AI coding agent itself with a PreToolUse hook and an MCP stdio gateway that review prompts and tool-calls before they run, including local tool activity that never crosses the network. The key data-residency difference: to classify content, Dopamine DLP by its own description sends the extracted text off the device ('The endpoint sends the extracted text to the dope.cloud Dopamine DLP API'), whereas MoorAI is content-free by default, so only a category, a risk level and a keyed one-way hash (plus the login and hostname, which the console pseudonymises on arrival) leave the machine.

Is dope.security's on-device SSL inspection the same as content-free?

No. Running inspection on the device and keeping content on the device are different properties. dope.security decrypts and applies policy locally rather than backhauling traffic to a cloud proxy, which is an architectural advantage over legacy SWGs. But to classify a prompt or file, Dopamine DLP extracts the text and sends it to the dope.cloud Dopamine DLP API, which per dope 'uses OpenAI's zero data retention APIs', so the content itself is still analyzed off-device. Zero retention means the text is not stored or trained on, but it still leaves the device. MoorAI's design means that, by default, plaintext never leaves the machine; the signals that reach the console are a category, a risk level and a keyed one-way hash (plus the login and hostname, which the console pseudonymises on arrival). The one exception: an administrator can turn on a capture tier, which does store the matched text it was enabled to collect.

Where does dope.security cover more ground than MoorAI?

In breadth of web traffic, by a wide margin. Because the on-device proxy sits in front of everything that speaks HTTPS, dope.security covers general SaaS and web DLP beyond AI, URL filtering, blocking malicious sites, Cloud App Controls and CASB, and shadow-IT discovery across all web apps, with no per-app integration. Its full web-traffic TLS inspection is shipping today, where MoorAI's local TLS inspection is only a roadmap, opt-in layer that is not shipping. It also governs AI chat in the browser and in cloud AI desktop apps directly at egress with content-aware DLP, where MoorAI covers that surface only partially through discovery and a companion browser extension. MoorAI does none of the general web-security work and does not attempt to.

Do MoorAI and dope.security compete?

They overlap but sit at different layers and are largely complementary. dope.security gives broad, network-level coverage of every app that speaks HTTPS (browsers, thick clients, cloud AI apps) without needing an integration, plus a full web-security stack. MoorAI goes deep on the coding agents developers run, seeing the actual tool call and its arguments before execution, including local MCP over stdio and other activity a network proxy cannot observe. Use dope.security for organization-wide web and AI egress control; use MoorAI where prompt content must never leave the machine, or where you need to govern agent tool-calls and produce content-free, signed evidence.

MoorAI vs dope.security, full comparison →
Operant AI

How is MoorAI different from Operant AI?

They share an enemy but sit at different vantage points. Operant AI is a Kubernetes-native runtime-defense platform: it protects cloud workloads, APIs (external and east-west) and the AI applications you host, framed as 3D discovery, detection and defense, and it also ships an MCP Gateway and an Endpoint Protector that discovers shadow AI tools, coding agents and MCP clients on employee devices. Its approach is content-inspecting and proprietary. MoorAI is narrower and opposite in data model: content-free, open-source (MIT) runtime guardrails for AI agents, apps and APIs, deepest on the coding agents developers run (a PreToolUse hook plus a local MCP stdio proxy and browser extension), where only category, risk and a keyed one-way hash (plus the login and hostname, which the console pseudonymises on arrival) leave the device.

Does Operant AI govern MCP?

Yes. Operant ships an MCP Gateway that it describes as real-time visibility and controls for every MCP server, client, tools and connections, so this page does not mark Operant absent on MCP. Both products mediate MCP tool calls, apply MCP access controls and can block risky AI actions before they run. The distinction is where each runs: Operant's depth is server-side, in the cluster and at the API data plane, while MoorAI governs the MCP call on the developer's own laptop with per-tool argument rules and a content-free, signed record.

Where does Operant AI cover more ground than MoorAI?

At the runtime and API tier, by a wide margin. Because Operant's platform is Kubernetes-native, it protects cloud workloads at runtime, gives API and network data-plane visibility across external and east-west traffic, defends secrets and exfiltration inside the cluster, protects the AI applications you host rather than just the coding agents you run, deploys server-side with no endpoint install, blocks live attacks against production, protects data-in-use across microservices, and offers inline content redaction and tokenization. MoorAI does none of that server-side work and ships its endpoint agent for macOS, Windows and Linux, with the desktop app and its on-device OCR on macOS and Windows.

Why choose MoorAI over Operant AI for coding agents?

Because MoorAI is content-free and open, and you can verify it. Only category, risk and a keyed one-way hash (HMAC-SHA-256; plus the login and hostname, which the console pseudonymises on arrival) leave the endpoint, and the agent is MIT, so you read the interceptor and the exact signal schema rather than trust a closed binary. Operant's runtime model is content-inspecting and proprietary. On the coding-agent surface MoorAI also adds per-tool MCP argument rules on the machine, a block on a secret being read into context, rules-file and skill-file poisoning detection, on-device OCR, cryptographically signed decisions and a content-free per-agent assurance score. The two are complementary: run Operant for the cluster, the APIs and hosted AI apps; run MoorAI for the coding agents on developers' laptops.

MoorAI vs Operant AI, full comparison →
Lakera

How is MoorAI different from Lakera Guard?

They protect different layers. Lakera Guard is a cloud API you build into a deployed LLM application: per Lakera's own docs, integrating is as simple as making a POST request to the guard endpoint for each interaction with the LLM, passing the raw user and external input and the LLM output. That means the app sends prompts and responses to api.lakera.ai to be screened. MoorAI sits one layer earlier, on the developer's own machine, reviewing each prompt to a coding agent such as Claude Code, Cursor or Copilot CLI locally, before it is sent anywhere, and by default only a category, a risk level and a keyed one-way hash (plus the login and hostname, which the console pseudonymises on arrival) ever leave the device. On-device review of the coding agent versus a cloud API screening a deployed app.

Where does Lakera cover more ground than MoorAI?

In several places. Lakera protects deployed, production LLM applications and APIs across any model and any cloud, which MoorAI does not attempt; MoorAI wraps the coding agents on a developer's macOS, Windows or Linux machine. Lakera's detection is a benchmarked, centrally-updated classifier trained on a large proprietary attack dataset from Gandalf, the world's largest red team, with multi-turn and multilingual prompt-injection detection; MoorAI's on-device checks are regex-first, with semantic escalation only opportunistic and local. Lakera also runs continuous AI red-teaming, and since September 2025 it is part of Check Point. If the requirement is runtime protection for an LLM app you ship, that is Lakera's product, not MoorAI's.

Does MoorAI send my prompts to the cloud like a cloud service?

No. Review happens on the device and, by default, content never leaves the machine. Security teams receive only redacted, content-free signals (a category, a risk level and a keyed one-way hash, plus the login and hostname, which the console pseudonymises on arrival), never the actual prompts or conversations. Three exceptions apply: an administrator can turn on a capture tier, which does store the matched text it was enabled to collect; on platforms whose operating system cannot read an image locally, the desktop app can send a pasted screenshot to Anthropic’s API for text extraction, using an Anthropic API key already on the device and never MoorAI; and an opt-in model second opinion can send the text of an ambiguous scan to Anthropic’s API the same way.

Is MoorAI open source?

The MoorAI community agent is open source under MIT and runs with no account required, coaching on every risky action; enrolled in the MoorAI console, free self-hosted for an organisation with no user limit, it enforces policy. Lakera Guard is a proprietary cloud service, now part of Check Point, with a free developer tier and sales-gated paid tiers.

MoorAI vs Lakera, full comparison →
SentinelOne

What is SentinelOne's AI security offering?

It is the former Prompt Security, a GenAI-security company SentinelOne acquired in 2025 and is folding into its Singularity platform. It is a broad offering (prompt-injection defense, DLP for generative-AI apps, and a real-time AI firewall) delivered as a browser extension, a gateway or reverse-proxy, and an API that fronts your own AI applications, now marketed as Prompt Security for Employees, for AI Code Assistants, and for AI Agents, alongside the Purple AI agentic SOC analyst. Per its own material it will redact sensitive data and enforce policies across 15,000+ AI services and scrub sensitive outputs with a real-time AI firewall.

How is MoorAI different from SentinelOne?

They govern different things. SentinelOne's AI security is org-wide, and its mechanism is to read the content and redact it. MoorAI is narrower and deeper: runtime guardrails for AI agents, apps and APIs, deepest on AI coding agents (Claude Code, Cursor, Copilot CLI, Claude Desktop), using a PreToolUse hook and an MCP stdio proxy to intercept the action before it runs, and it is content-free by architecture, so only a category, a risk level and a keyed one-way hash (plus the login and hostname, which the console pseudonymises on arrival) ever leave the device. The agent is MIT, so the content-free claim is auditable rather than asserted.

Is the difference that SentinelOne is cloud and MoorAI is local?

No. SentinelOne can be self-hosted and its browser extension does some detection client-side, so it is not simply a cloud service. The line is content. An AI firewall that redacts a prompt has to read the prompt; that is its mechanism. MoorAI's mechanism is content-free by architecture: detection runs on the device and only category, risk and a keyed one-way hash (HMAC-SHA-256; plus the login and hostname, which the console pseudonymises on arrival) leave it. Three exceptions apply: an administrator can turn on a capture tier that stores the matched text it was enabled to collect; where the OS cannot OCR an image locally the desktop app can send a pasted screenshot to Anthropic’s API for text extraction, using an Anthropic API key already on the device and never MoorAI; and an opt-in model second opinion can send the text of an ambiguous scan to Anthropic’s API the same way.

Where does SentinelOne cover more ground than MoorAI?

In breadth. Because the Prompt Security engine inspects content in the path and is aimed at the whole organization, SentinelOne covers org-wide GenAI DLP across every employee rather than just developers, thousands of SaaS AI tools with no integration, browser AI chat fleet-wide, inline redaction of PII, secrets and source code, a real-time firewall in front of your own homegrown AI apps, and pre-deployment red-teaming, all inside a full XDR/EDR platform with SOC automation (Purple AI) and SIEM integration. MoorAI attempts none of that: it is macOS, Windows and Linux and deliberately narrow: the tool and model calls AI agents make, deepest on the coding agents your developers run, and content-free evidence of both.

Does MoorAI govern MCP and local tool calls?

Yes, and that is where it goes deeper than a content-inspecting firewall. MoorAI's enforcement is action-centric: it allow-lists the MCP server, constrains per-tool arguments, and blocks the tool call before it executes, including local MCP servers driven over stdio whose filesystem, git and database calls never touch the network for a proxy to inspect. SentinelOne's enforcement is content- and egress-centric: it inspects and redacts what an agent is about to transmit. The two overlap on prompt and output inspection, shadow-AI discovery, MCP server inventory, and skill or agent-config integrity analysis, so they are more complementary than competitive.

MoorAI vs SentinelOne, full comparison →
Netskope

How is MoorAI different from Netskope?

Netskope One is an enterprise SASE/SSE platform that governs an organization's whole AI estate (public SaaS, private AI, and agents) by inspecting traffic inline through its gateway and broker in the network path. MoorAI is narrower: it reviews the prompts a developer sends to a coding agent locally, on the developer's machine, before anything is sent, so prompt content never reaches a gateway. The difference is scope and architecture: a broad inline platform versus an on-device coding-agent guardrail.

Does MoorAI inspect prompts inline like a gateway?

No. MoorAI reviews the tool call on the device, before it executes, and by default prompt content never leaves the machine. Security teams receive only redacted, content-free signals (a category, a risk level and a keyed one-way hash, plus the login and hostname, which the console pseudonymises on arrival), never the prompts. A SASE/SSE gateway model, by contrast, steers traffic to a provider's cloud and inspects the content in transit. Image handling stays on-device too: MoorAI uses native OCR (macOS Vision.framework, Windows OCR). A provider-key fallback exists only where no OCR engine is available, and it goes from the device to Anthropic’s API directly, never to MoorAI. macOS always has its engine; on Windows the fallback is reachable when no OCR language pack is installed for a profile language.

Do MoorAI and Netskope compete?

They are more complementary than competitive. Netskope is built for organization-wide AI governance under a single platform. MoorAI governs the AI agents developers run, on the device, and is open source (MIT). Use MoorAI where keeping developers' prompt content on the machine is a hard requirement.

MoorAI vs Netskope, full comparison →
Forcepoint

How is MoorAI different from Forcepoint AI Data Security?

Forcepoint AI Data Security is a data-centric DLP platform that inspects AI prompts and responses in real time, discovers shadow AI, and enforces policy on agent MCP traffic through an inline AI Agent Gateway, governed from a single cloud console. MoorAI is narrower: it reviews the prompts a developer sends to a coding agent locally, on the developer's machine, before anything is sent, so prompt content is never inspected off-device. Security teams receive only redacted, content-free signals: a category, a risk level, and a keyed one-way hash (plus the login and hostname, which the console pseudonymises on arrival). MoorAI is open source (MIT).

Does MoorAI inspect prompt and response content like Forcepoint?

No. MoorAI is content-free by default. Review happens on the device and, by default, prompt or response content never leaves the machine: no cloud inspection, and no content logged to a console unless an administrator explicitly turns on the capture tier. A DLP model, by contrast, inspects and classifies the actual content to enforce policy and record incidents.

Where does Forcepoint cover more ground than MoorAI?

By a wide margin. Forcepoint AI Data Security is a broad enterprise platform: mature DLP across web, cloud, endpoint, network and email; data classification and discovery at scale across structured and unstructured, on-prem and cloud; DSPM and DDR; a CASB and secure web gateway; an AI Agent Gateway that brokers credential-free, field-level agent access to enterprise apps like Salesforce, Microsoft 365 and Jira; and governance of enterprise AI assistants such as Microsoft 365 Copilot and ChatGPT Enterprise, all from one org-wide console. MoorAI does none of that. MoorAI runs on macOS, Windows and Linux endpoints, scoped to what AI agents do at the point of action, deepest on the coding agents developers run, and marks itself absent across all of Forcepoint's enterprise data-security breadth.

Do MoorAI and Forcepoint compete?

They are more complementary than competitive. Forcepoint is built for organization-wide AI data governance across SaaS, browser, and enterprise AI apps, with mature DLP and classification. MoorAI governs what AI agents do at runtime, deepest on the coding agents developers run, and is open source. Use MoorAI where keeping developers' prompt content on the machine is a hard requirement, or where you want an auditable, content-free evidence trail without routing prompts through a vendor.

MoorAI vs Forcepoint, full comparison →
Salt Security

How is MoorAI different from Salt Security?

Salt Security is an API-security vendor extending to agentic AI with its Agentic Security Graph, securing the API and network layer inline, org-wide, with observability into API traffic, MCP servers, and agent interactions. MoorAI is runtime guardrails for AI agents, apps and APIs, deepest on developers' coding agents: it reviews prompts and MCP tool-calls locally, on the machine, before anything reaches an API. It is content-free by construction, so by default prompt and payload content never leaves the endpoint. The two operate at different layers (Salt at the gateway, MoorAI at the endpoint) and are largely complementary. MoorAI is open source (MIT).

Do MoorAI and Salt Security compete?

They are largely complementary. Salt inspects API traffic to and from models at the gateway; MoorAI enforces on the developer endpoint, before a request ever reaches an API. Use Salt where you need org-wide, inline visibility into agent and API traffic; use MoorAI where keeping prompt and payload content on the machine is a hard requirement, or where you want auditable, content-free ISO 42001 evidence without routing prompts through a vendor.

Where does Salt Security cover more ground than MoorAI?

On its home ground, by a wide margin. Salt is a mature enterprise API-security platform: org-wide API discovery including shadow and zombie APIs, API posture governance at scale, external attack-surface scanning of public MCP endpoints (Salt Surface), source-repo scanning for shadow APIs and MCP risk (Salt Connect), runtime API-traffic analysis (Salt Collect), and inline behavioral threat detection that, per Salt, detects and blocks API threats in real time (Salt Protect). It reaches server-side agents and any API consumer, and it is OS-independent. MoorAI does none of that: it is a per-endpoint agent for macOS, Windows and Linux, deliberately narrow to the tool, MCP and model calls AI agents make, deepest on the coding agents developers run, and content-free evidence of both.

How does MoorAI support ISO 42001 without egress?

Salt positions ISO 42001 as implicitly requiring API security. MoorAI's angle is evidence without egress: it produces content-free, cryptographically signed decisions, an Event Flow / data-lineage view, an AIBOM, and compliance packs mapped to ISO 27001/42001. Together they are proof of data governance that you can hand an auditor without routing prompts or API payloads through a vendor's cloud.

MoorAI vs Salt Security, full comparison →
BigID

How is MoorAI different from BigID?

They live on different layers. BigID is an enterprise data-security and governance platform. Its own material calls it an Enterprise Data Security Platform for DSPM and AI that discovers and secures data across hundreds of sources, classifying it with thousands of pre-trained classifiers. That is data at rest. MoorAI governs the AI coding agent at the point of use on the device: a PreToolUse hook, an MCP stdio proxy and a browser extension that score agent behaviour against a 85-threat matrix and block the tool call before it executes, with only category, risk and a keyed one-way hash (plus the login and hostname, which the console pseudonymises on arrival) ever leaving the machine.

Do MoorAI and BigID compete?

More complementary than competing. BigID answers where sensitive data lives and who may touch it across the enterprise; MoorAI answers whether one agent is about to run a dangerous tool call right now on one laptop. BigID governs data where it rests; MoorAI enforces on the agent action where the work happens, and can stop regulated data being pasted into a coding agent from an endpoint BigID never reaches.

Where does BigID cover more ground than MoorAI?

In breadth at the data layer, by a wide margin. BigID does data discovery across hundreds of stores, best-in-class PII and sensitive-data classification, DSPM, data access governance, privacy automation including DSARs and consent, data retention and deletion, and warehouse policy push, all with connectors that scan the store directly and no agent integration. MoorAI does none of that. MoorAI is single-purpose and local: the tool, MCP and model calls AI agents make, deepest on the coding agents your developers run, and content-free evidence of both.

Where is MoorAI stronger than BigID?

At the agent's action and the record of it. BigID is not in the path when a coding agent is about to run a destructive shell command, read a credential file, or drive a local MCP server over stdio that never touches the network. MoorAI sits at exactly that point: it scores the run against a 85-threat matrix, allow-lists the MCP server, constrains the arguments, blocks before execution, and lands a signed, content-free record mapped to the OWASP LLM Top 10, NIST AI RMF, ISO 42001 and the EU AI Act. It is open source under MIT and free to start.

MoorAI vs BigID, full comparison →
Harmonic Security

How is MoorAI different from Harmonic Security?

They solve different problems, and both classify on the device. Harmonic Security is workforce-wide GenAI DLP: inline small language models on the endpoint that discover, coach and block sensitive data across 1,000+ AI web tools, embedded AI and desktop apps, rolled out through MDM. MoorAI is open-core, content-free runtime guardrails for AI agents, apps and APIs, deepest on the coding agents developers run: a PreToolUse hook and an MCP stdio gateway that see which tool is about to run with which arguments and can block it before it executes. MoorAI goes deeper on coding-agent actions, MCP argument rules, and signed content-free evidence; Harmonic covers vastly more GenAI surface across the whole workforce.

Where does classification run for MoorAI and Harmonic Security?

Both run detection on the endpoint. Harmonic states its inline SLMs sit on the endpoint to analyze and redact sensitive data, with no proxy or certificate. MoorAI evaluates the prompt, the tool call and the agent's context locally, and by default emits only category, risk and a keyed one-way hash (plus the login and hostname, which the console pseudonymises on arrival), and nothing content-bearing. Since both classify on the device, the differences are that MoorAI's content-free guarantee is auditable because the agent is open source (MIT), and that MoorAI's depth is coding-agent actions and MCP rather than broad web GenAI DLP.

Where does Harmonic Security cover more ground than MoorAI?

In breadth. Harmonic protects the whole workforce, not just developers, across 1,000+ AI web tools, embedded AI such as Salesforce Einstein and Grammarly, a wide browser matrix, and desktop apps, with context-aware SLM classification of PII, source code and financial data, shadow-AI inventory categorized by business use case, MDM fleet rollout through Intune, JAMF, Kandji or Group Policy, and published detection-accuracy claims. MoorAI does none of that at workforce scale. MoorAI is an endpoint agent for macOS, Windows and Linux and deliberately narrow: the tool and model calls AI agents make, deepest on the coding agents your developers run, and content-free evidence of both.

Is Harmonic Security the same as Harmonic AI?

No. Harmonic Security is a point-of-use GenAI governance and DLP company. It is a distinct, unrelated company from the math-reasoning lab commonly called Harmonic AI. The two should not be conflated.

MoorAI vs Harmonic Security, full comparison →
Zenity

How is MoorAI different from Zenity?

They secure AI agents from opposite ends of the org. Zenity is a cross-estate agent-governance platform that connects to the places an enterprise builds and deploys agents (Copilot Studio, Power Platform, Salesforce Agentforce, ServiceNow, AWS Bedrock, Vertex AI, ChatGPT Enterprise) and also inventories coding assistants on developer endpoints, observing, enforcing and defending from a central console. In its own words it is the platform purpose-built to secure the decision, and at runtime it lets an action through, blocks it, or shuts the agent down. MoorAI is open-core (MIT) runtime guardrails for AI agents, apps and APIs, deepest on the coding agents a developer runs (Claude Code, Cursor, Copilot CLI, Claude Desktop), using a PreToolUse hook and an MCP stdio proxy so only category, risk and a keyed one-way hash (plus the login and hostname, which the console pseudonymises on arrival) ever leave the machine. Zenity is governance-console-first across the whole estate; MoorAI is content-free and on-device on the developer endpoint.

Do MoorAI and Zenity compete or complement each other?

They are more complementary than competitive. Zenity governs every agent the organization builds, buys and deploys across SaaS, cloud and low-code from one console. MoorAI enforces content-level DLP on the developer endpoint where keeping prompt content local is a hard requirement, catching things like a coding agent reading a .env file or driving a local MCP server over stdio that never crosses a network a console could inspect. They overlap on the developer coding agent: both discover shadow AI, mediate MCP tool calls, block before execution, and map findings to OWASP LLM and MITRE ATLAS.

Where is Zenity stronger, and where is MoorAI stronger?

Zenity is stronger in breadth: it governs enterprise-built agents on Copilot Studio, Power Platform, Salesforce Agentforce and ServiceNow, cloud platforms like Bedrock and Vertex AI, SaaS copilots, and low-code apps: a whole-estate inventory under one console with build-time posture, policy simulation, and an adversarial-research program (Zenity Labs) that contributed techniques to MITRE ATLAS. MoorAI touches none of those platform-built agents. MoorAI is stronger on the developer endpoint: no content-bearing telemetry by architecture, content-level prompt and output DLP, catching the local file read, on-device OCR, break-glass offline fail-closed with no console dependency, and open source under MIT so the content-free claim is auditable. Zenity is macOS/Windows-and-cloud broad; MoorAI is endpoint-only (macOS, Windows and Linux) and deliberately narrow.

MoorAI vs Zenity, full comparison →
Cycode

How is MoorAI different from Cycode?

They solve overlapping problems at different scopes. Cycode is a full Application Security Posture Management (ASPM) platform (SAST, SCA, secrets detection, IaC, container and CI/CD security, and software supply-chain governance) that has extended into AI: it scans the code an agent generates and adds AI Guardrails that hook the IDE and agent to block secrets before a prompt, a file read or an MCP tool call leaves the machine, plus AIBOM inventory and MCP allow-listing. MoorAI is deliberately narrow: an open-source (MIT), content-free runtime governor for the coding agent's actions. It intercepts the agent's tool call via a PreToolUse hook and an MCP stdio proxy, runs a 85-threat detection matrix on the device, and emits only category, risk and a keyed one-way hash (plus the login and hostname, which the console pseudonymises on arrival), never prompt content.

Do MoorAI and Cycode overlap?

Yes, and substantially. Both run detection on the device by hooking the IDE and agent, both inspect prompts before they reach the model, both intercept MCP tool calls before they execute, both allow-list MCP servers, both discover shadow AI, and both build a live AIBOM inventory of the agents, models and MCP servers in use. Anyone evaluating them should expect a real overlap in the AI-agent governance layer.

Where does Cycode cover more ground than MoorAI?

Across the whole software development lifecycle. Cycode is a complete ASPM platform: static analysis (SAST), software composition analysis (SCA), secrets detection across repositories and history, Infrastructure-as-Code scanning, container security, CI/CD pipeline security and runtime monitoring, software supply-chain and SSDF governance, source-code leakage detection, SBOM generation, a unified posture graph, and a PR-native remediation workflow that scans and auto-fixes the code an agent writes. MoorAI attempts none of that and has no roadmap to; it governs the coding agent's runtime actions, not the codebase.

Is MoorAI open source, and what does it send off the device?

Yes. The MoorAI community agent is open source under MIT and runs standalone with no account, so its content-free claim is auditable: only category, risk and a keyed one-way hash (plus the login and hostname, which the console pseudonymises on arrival) leave the device, and by default no prompt content does. Cycode redacts the secret value itself from what reaches the model, but it is proprietary and logs interaction events to a centralized dashboard for security-team visibility, so it is not content-free in the same architectural sense and the guarantee cannot be independently verified.

MoorAI vs Cycode, full comparison →
Bifrost Edge

How is MoorAI different from Bifrost Edge?

They sit at different tiers. Bifrost Edge is the endpoint layer of Maxim AI's Bifrost gateway: per its own material it routes all AI traffic through your Bifrost so the virtual keys, budgets, audit logs and guardrails defined once at the gateway apply on every machine. That means prompts, responses and files pass through the gateway. MoorAI does the opposite: it inspects on the device and emits only content-free signals (a category, a risk level and a keyed one-way hash, plus the login and hostname, which the console pseudonymises on arrival), so by default prompt content never leaves the machine. MoorAI is MIT and coding-agent-scoped (PreToolUse hook plus a local MCP stdio gateway); Bifrost Edge is a broader network-tier proxy for all AI traffic tied to the central Bifrost gateway.

Does Bifrost Edge send prompts off the device?

By design its traffic passes through the gateway. Bifrost Edge routes AI traffic from desktop chat apps, browser AI, coding agents and MCP servers through the central Bifrost gateway, which is where policy, audit logs, budgets and guardrails are applied, so the content flows through the gateway. That is what makes it broad: it governs any AI app on the machine, not just coding agents. MoorAI reviews prompts on the device and sends security teams only content-free signals by default, so nothing sensitive leaves the endpoint. The trade-off is that MoorAI sees the agents, apps and model calls it is wired into, rather than all AI traffic on the machine.

Where does Bifrost Edge cover more ground than MoorAI?

In breadth. Because Bifrost Edge routes all AI traffic through the gateway, it governs desktop chat apps, browser AI and coding agents alike. The gateway adds centralized virtual keys across 8+ providers and 1000+ models, org-wide budgets and spend tracking, semantic caching, adaptive load balancing with automatic failover, unified OpenTelemetry observability across all AI traffic, and MDM rollout via Jamf, Intune or Kandji on macOS, Windows and Linux. MoorAI does none of those: it is a narrow, content-free guardrail for the coding agents on macOS, Windows and Linux machines and the agent services wired to its sidecar, MCP gateway or model proxy.

Can you use MoorAI and a Bifrost-style gateway together?

Yes. They pair naturally because they work at different tiers. A centralized AI gateway sits at the network tier and governs all AI traffic across every app with centralized keys, budgets and failover. MoorAI sits on the coding-agent endpoint and adds what a traffic-routing proxy cannot see: it blocks a secret file being read into context, enforces per-tool MCP argument rules over local stdio servers that never touch the network, inspects rules and skill files for poisoning, and lands a signed, content-free record of every decision. Gateway for org-wide breadth and spend control; MoorAI for deep, content-free enforcement where developers run coding agents.

MoorAI vs Bifrost Edge, full comparison →
Ent

How is MoorAI different from Ent?

They act at different scopes. Ent is a broad intent-aware endpoint prevention platform that evaluates human and AI-agent activity across applications, browsers, workflows and data movement (insider risk, AI governance, data-loss prevention and last-mile threats) through one lightweight endpoint agent on Windows, macOS, Linux and the browser. MoorAI is a focused guardrail for AI agents, apps and APIs, deepest on the coding agents developers run (Claude Code, Cursor, Codex): it inspects prompts, context reads, MCP tool calls and outputs on the device, and by default reports only content-free signals (a category, a risk level and a keyed one-way hash, plus the login and hostname, which the console pseudonymises on arrival), so prompt content never leaves the machine. MoorAI is open source (MIT).

Are MoorAI and Ent competitors or complementary?

Mostly complementary. They overlap on flagging sensitive content before it reaches an AI application and on governing shadow AI on the endpoint. But Ent is far broader: it covers human insider risk, application activity, general data-loss prevention and last-mile threats across the whole endpoint and across Windows, macOS and Linux. MoorAI is deliberately narrow: it goes deep on the coding-agent runtime, governs the MCP tool-call layer at call time, and keeps prompt content on the device. In a large org, Ent for broad people-plus-apps-plus-AI endpoint prevention, MoorAI for content-free, auditable coding-agent guardrails where prompts must stay local.

Does MoorAI send prompt content off the device like Ent does?

No. By default MoorAI inspects on the device and sends only redacted, content-free signals (a category, a risk level and a keyed one-way hash, plus the login and hostname, which the console pseudonymises on arrival); full-fidelity capture is a tier an administrator can turn on explicitly. Because the MoorAI agent is open source (MIT), that behavior is auditable. Ent is built around behavioral context: it observes activity across applications, browsers and data movement so it can investigate and intervene, and it offers SaaS or self-hosted deployment with data sovereignty. Verify Ent's data-handling specifics against Ent's own documentation at ent.ai.

MoorAI vs Ent, full comparison →
Endor Labs

How is MoorAI different from Endor Labs' AI Agent Governance?

Endor Labs is an AI-native application-security platform (reachability-based SCA, AI SAST, secret detection, a malicious-package firewall) that added coding-agent governance by wiring into the agent's own hooks (Claude Code, Cursor). Its own material says it will stream 'every prompt, every tool call, every shell command, every file read' to the Endor Labs backend as a centrally searchable audit trail. MoorAI rides the same PreToolUse hooks, but three things differ: it is content-free by default (only a category, risk level, and keyed one-way hash, plus the login and hostname, which the console pseudonymises on arrival, leave the device), the enforcement decision is made on the device with no cloud console in the loop, and it adds a tamper-evident posture ratchet that detects and alerts if those hooks are stripped or overridden rather than silently failing open. MoorAI is also fully open source (MIT).

Does MoorAI intercept the agent without using its hooks?

No. MoorAI uses the coding agent's PreToolUse hooks, the same lifecycle mechanism Endor uses. What MoorAI adds is a tamper-evident posture ratchet: it fingerprints the agent's hook-bearing settings and auto-loaded skill surface, so if a config change removes or overrides the hooks, MoorAI detects the drift and alerts instead of the enforcement simply disappearing unnoticed. That guarantee is detection and alerting; MoorAI does not intercept independently of the agent.

Does Endor Labs keep prompt content on the machine?

Endor's free developer scanning runs locally. Its Agent Governance, by its own description, streams 'every prompt, every tool call, every shell command, every file read' to the Endor Labs backend to produce a centrally searchable audit trail, and the policy lives server-side. It does not publicly claim content-free operation. MoorAI is content-free by design: prompt content never leaves the machine unless an administrator explicitly turns on full capture, which is off by default.

Where does Endor Labs cover more ground than MoorAI?

In application security, by a wide margin. Endor secures the code the agent produces: reachability-based SCA that keeps only the vulnerabilities your code can actually reach, AI SAST with dataflow analysis, secret detection before commit, a malicious-package firewall across npm, PyPI, Maven and NuGet, container scanning, AI code review of pull requests, and CI/CD pipeline gating with fix-at-scale remediation. MoorAI does none of that; it does not scan code. MoorAI governs the live coding-agent interaction content-free and lands signed, content-free evidence. If you want one platform for AI-generated-code security and agent governance, Endor is the broader bet; MoorAI is the on-device, content-free guardrail on the interaction itself.

MoorAI vs Endor Labs, full comparison →
Certiv

How is MoorAI different from Certiv?

They share a category and diverge on one axis. Both run on the endpoint and intercept an AI agent's action before it executes. Certiv calls itself AI Agent Assurance for Endpoints and continuously authorizes model requests and tool calls. The difference is what happens to content. Certiv's intent engine evaluates purpose by reading agent context: per its own material it tracks user prompts, model reasoning steps, tool calls and data. MoorAI is content-free by architecture: prompt and response content never leaves the device, only category, risk and a keyed one-way hash (plus the login and hostname, which the console pseudonymises on arrival). And MoorAI's agent is open source (MIT), so that content-free property is auditable rather than asserted.

Where does Certiv cover more ground than MoorAI?

In breadth. Certiv ships Mac, Windows, Linux and container agents at first-class parity and reaches CI/CD, where MoorAI’s agent runs on macOS, Windows and Linux, with its desktop app on macOS and Windows only. Certiv governs the whole agentic workforce (any AI agent on the endpoint, not just coding agents) with a semantic intent engine that evaluates purpose not just pattern, model-reasoning-chain visibility, agent-to-agent interaction monitoring, SaaS-application governance, and interactive pause-and-approve workflows. It is a SOC 2-certified managed platform. MoorAI is deliberately narrower: the tool and model calls AI agents make, deepest on the coding agents developers run, and content-free evidence of both.

Is Certiv content-free like MoorAI?

Not in the same sense. Certiv's value is an intent engine that evaluates the purpose of an agent's action, and its own material lists the context it reads: user prompts, model reasoning steps, tool calls and data. That is content-aware by design. Certiv is endpoint-based, so processing can happen locally, but Certiv is proprietary and publishes no egress guarantee, so what its telemetry contains cannot be verified either way. MoorAI takes the opposite stance: content is classified on the device and only category, risk and a keyed one-way hash (plus the login and hostname, which the console pseudonymises on arrival) leave it, and because the agent is MIT anyone can read the code and confirm there is no content path off the machine.

MoorAI vs Certiv, full comparison →
Backslash

How is MoorAI different from Backslash?

Backslash spans two layers. Its heritage is a reachability-based AppSec platform (SCA, SAST, SBOM, VEX, secrets and phantom-package detection at build and CI time) that reads your source to find exploitable, reachable vulnerabilities in AI-generated code. MoorAI does none of that. Backslash has also moved onto the endpoint with an agentic-AI product that discovers agents, MCP servers and skills and runs an MCP proxy on the developer workstation that intercepts inbound and outbound activity in real time. That is MoorAI's territory and the overlap is real. The divide is the mechanism: Backslash's proxy reads prompt and tool-call content to work; MoorAI is a content-free PreToolUse hook plus an MCP stdio gateway, emitting only category, risk and a keyed one-way hash (plus the login and hostname, which the console pseudonymises on arrival), and it is open source (MIT) so that claim is auditable.

Where do MoorAI and Backslash overlap?

Since Backslash moved onto the endpoint, the shared surface is substantial. Both intercept on the developer's own machine rather than a cloud gateway, both block the MCP tool call before it executes, both allow-list or blocklist MCP servers, both inspect tool-call arguments, and both detect prompt injection, data exfiltration and privilege escalation. Both discover AI agents, IDEs and MCP servers on the endpoint, both review AI output as well as prompts, and both analyze the agent skill and rules-file surface; MoorAI built that last one partly because of Backslash's own research. This page marks those as overlap, not absence.

Where is Backslash stronger?

Securing the code the agent writes and its supply chain: reachability-based SCA, full SAST, secrets detection, SBOM and VEX, phantom or undeclared package detection, CI/CD gating with a PR-native workflow, code-fix remediation, business-impact and attack-path prioritization, and prompt rules that steer the model to generate more secure code. Backslash also curates the MCP Server Security Hub, a risk-rated database of 15,000-plus public MCP servers, and carries enterprise ASPM breadth with native SIEM and SOC integration. MoorAI does not attempt build-time code security and has no roadmap to.

Where is MoorAI stronger?

Trust and privacy at runtime, and the evidence trail. MoorAI is content-free by default: its telemetry is a category, a risk and a keyed one-way hash (plus the login and hostname, which the console pseudonymises on arrival), never the prompt or the code. Three exceptions apply: an admin-enabled capture tier that stores the text it was set to collect, OCR in the desktop app falling back to Anthropic’s API with an Anthropic API key already on the device only where the OS cannot read an image locally, and an opt-in model second opinion that can send the text of an ambiguous scan to Anthropic’s API. Backslash's runtime value comes from a proxy that reads prompt and tool-call payloads on the developer's machine; MoorAI is architected so it never has to. MoorAI adds a signed, content-free record per decision, a content-free data-lineage view, a content-free per-agent assurance score, JIT elevation, a named lethal-trifecta detector, and it is open source, so the interceptor is readable rather than a closed content-inspecting proxy.

MoorAI vs Backslash, full comparison →
Kitecyber

How is MoorAI different from Kitecyber?

They intercept different things. Kitecyber is a hyperconverged endpoint platform (UEM, endpoint DLP, secure web gateway and ZTNA in one agent) whose AI controls run through a local decrypting proxy: per its own material, a local proxy on each device inspects traffic on the spot, with SSL inspection, URL filtering, threat prevention and SaaS controls all running locally. That is traffic interception, and it is the mechanism for everything the product does. MoorAI's default mechanism is action interception: a PreToolUse hook in the coding agent and an MCP stdio gateway that sees which tool is about to run with which arguments, and can block it before it executes, including local tool activity that never crosses the network.

Does MoorAI object to TLS inspection?

No. MoorAI's capability spec explicitly permits local TLS inspection as an optional extra layer, offered at install and off unless the user opts in. The difference is posture and invariant. For Kitecyber the decrypting proxy is always on and is how every control is delivered. For MoorAI it is an opt-in depth setting on top of the agent hook and MCP gateway, and it must satisfy an invariant Kitecyber does not claim: decryption and classification both happen on the device, sending content to a third-party API to classify it is forbidden, the root CA is generated locally per device and never escrowed, and uninstall removes it. MoorAI does not ship TLS inspection today; it is on the roadmap.

Where does Kitecyber cover more ground than MoorAI?

In breadth, by a wide margin. Because the local proxy sits in front of everything that speaks HTTPS, Kitecyber covers general SaaS and web DLP beyond AI, URL filtering, phishing and ransomware blocking, and email DLP. It also brings endpoint DLP across USB, print and screenshot channels, full UEM with zero-touch enrollment and remote lock and wipe, fleet device posture and patch management, ZTNA for private-app access, human insider-risk analytics, device-compliance automation for SOC 2, HIPAA, PCI and CMMC, and Linux and iOS agents. MoorAI does none of those. MoorAI runs on macOS, Windows and Linux, with no desktop app on Linux and no iOS agent, and is deliberately narrow: the agents your developers run, the tool calls they make, and content-free evidence of both.

Does Kitecyber govern MCP?

Not in its published material. Kitecyber's AI security overlaps MoorAI in several places: it names Claude Code, Copilot and Codex, discovers shadow AI across browser tools, desktop apps and CLIs, inspects GenAI prompts in real time before data leaves, maps which SaaS destinations each agent reaches, and analyses agent skill and configuration files for unsafe instructions, which is a direct analog of MoorAI's rules-file poisoning detection. What is absent is MCP: no MCP server allow-listing, no tool-call gateway, no per-tool argument rules. Its enforcement is egress-centric (block the exfiltration) rather than action-centric (block the tool call before it runs).

MoorAI vs Kitecyber, full comparison →
Straiker

How is MoorAI different from Straiker?

Straiker is the closest direct competitor MoorAI has. Both stop the same kinds of action; they differ in where the decision is computed. Straiker's own Anthropic page says execution-path hooks stop the risky tool call before it fires, and its Defend AI page says it provides runtime security for coding agents including Cursor, GitHub Copilot and Claude Code, blocking destructive actions like file deletion and config changes. That is the same job MoorAI does. The wedge is location: Straiker's integration blog says to route model traces or proxy logs to Straiker's Detection Cloud, and its public on-prem installer provisions EKS and serves seven fine-tuned model profiles on vLLM across g4dn, g5 and g6e GPU node families, so self-hosted Straiker needs a GPU Kubernetes cluster. MoorAI evaluates a 85-entry threat matrix on the device itself, and only category, risk and a keyed one-way hash (plus the login and hostname, which the console pseudonymises on arrival) ever leave.

What happens when the detector is unreachable?

For the one enforcement point Straiker publishes source for, their Kong plugin, the configuration table lists fail_closed with a default of false: when Straiker cannot be reached, traffic passes uninspected and is stamped x-straiker-verdict: degraded, and setting fail_closed makes the plugin reject that traffic instead. The README advises operators to alert on degraded and unknown verdicts, because both mean the control is not running while the traffic looks healthy. It also documents a path where enforcement stops without erroring: a Claude Code body larger than Kong's 8 KB default buffer is proxied uninspected behind a 200 unless the buffer is raised first. That is a defensible availability choice for a gateway and Straiker documents it. MoorAI is the opposite: local evaluation with no network dependency, and fail-closed by default.

Where does Straiker cover more ground than MoorAI?

In thirteen places, and this is the vendor against whom MoorAI loses the most. Straiker runs automated adversarial red-teaming against your deployed agents with offensive models and continuous scheduled campaigns, where MoorAI only tests your own policy against a local corpus. It protects enterprise-built AI apps and customer-facing chatbots, covers builder platforms such as Bedrock AgentCore, Azure AI Foundry and Copilot Studio, and covers Claude Chat, Cowork and Enterprise through the Compliance API. Its detection is LLM-based and catches multi-turn obfuscated attacks a deterministic matrix will miss, it does multimodal image understanding rather than OCR plus text rules, it maintains an MCP vulnerability database at scale, it publishes exploit research that has produced vendor patches, it enforces at the API gateway tier through Kong, Azure APIM, LiteLLM and AgentGateway, it has agentic-browser guardrails, and it is SOC 2 and ISO 27001 certified. MoorAI governs one surface: the coding agent on a developer machine.

Doesn't semantic attack sophistication defeat MoorAI's threat matrix?

Partly. Straiker's whitepaper, No Hard Boundaries: The Case for Semantic Detection in Agentic AI, argues that pattern matching and small classifiers are the wrong primitive against modern semantic attacks, and against a largely deterministic 85-entry matrix that argument lands. MoorAI's answer is architectural: it stands at the point where the persuasion has to become an action. A PreToolUse hook sees rm -rf, a read of ~/.aws/credentials, or an MCP call to a server that is not on the allow-list, and it sees the same thing regardless of how eloquently the model was talked into it. You do not have to detect the argument to block the act. Where the act itself is ambiguous, such as a prompt going out or a document being summarised, Straiker's bet is the better one.

Does Straiker require infrastructure changes?

Straiker's Defend AI page says one-line install via API, SDK, webhook, or AI sensor with no thick clients, proxies, firewalls, or infrastructure changes required. Their GitHub organisation publishes five public repositories, and four of them are proxy or gateway integrations: kong, apim for Azure API Management, litellm and AgentGateway, alongside onprem-installer. Both statements are Straiker's own. The reasonable reading is that one-line install describes one of several deployment modes rather than the one their repositories are mostly about.

Does MoorAI govern local stdio MCP servers?

Yes, and this is the coverage gap that follows directly from where each product sits. Claude Desktop's filesystem, git and database MCP servers run over stdio on the local machine and never open a socket, so there is no trace to route and no traffic for a proxy or gateway to inspect. MoorAI's MCP stdio gateway sits in front of those servers on the device: server allow-listing, per-tool argument rules, and refusal before execution, with an ed25519-signed content-free record of each decision.

MoorAI vs Straiker, full comparison →
Noma Security

How is MoorAI different from Noma Security?

They meet at the same surface and diverge on the data model. Noma ships open-source Apache-2.0 guardrails plugins that hook the same coding agents MoorAI wraps: Claude Code, Codex, Cursor and GitHub Copilot. But in Noma's own words the plugins hook into each agent's native extension points and stream hook events to the Noma backend for policy evaluation, returning enforcement decisions to the agent, with visibility in the Noma Console; the plugin needs a Noma API key. So the open-source part is the thin hook client, and detection runs in Noma's cloud. MoorAI evaluates on the developer's own machine and is content-free by construction: by default only a category, a risk level and a keyed one-way hash (plus the login and hostname, which the console pseudonymises on arrival) leave the device (the prompt, the command and the file content do not), and the detector itself is MIT, so the content-free claim is auditable rather than asserted.

Where does Noma Security cover more ground than MoorAI?

In several places. Noma is a well-funded enterprise platform (132 million dollars raised, a 100 million dollar Series B in 2025 led by Evolution Equity Partners) with an enterprise console and four products beyond the coding-agent hooks: AI-SPM (posture management and AI asset discovery), Agent Access Control for AI agents and MCP servers, AI Red Teaming, and AI-DR runtime detection and response. It discovers coding assistants and their MCP servers across a fleet through EDR integration, scans MCP servers for supply-chain risk, and rolls out centrally through managed settings and MDM. Its scope spans LLM applications, RAG and agents across the whole enterprise, not just the coding agents on a laptop, and it holds ISO 27001, SOC 2 and HIPAA. If the requirement is a central enterprise governance plane across all AI, that is Noma's product, not MoorAI's.

Does MoorAI send my prompts to a cloud console like Noma?

No. Review happens on the device and, by default, content never leaves the machine. Security teams receive only redacted, content-free signals (a category, a risk level and a keyed one-way hash, plus the login and hostname, which the console pseudonymises on arrival), never the actual prompts, commands or file contents. Noma's coding-agent plugin masks some secret-looking values locally, but by its own documentation it streams hook events to the Noma backend for evaluation and reports them in the Noma Console, and an independent 2026 review describes Noma as a SaaS-delivered governance control plane whose telemetry routes to external infrastructure. MoorAI has three exceptions: an administrator can turn on a capture tier that stores the matched text it was enabled to collect; on a platform whose operating system cannot read an image locally, the desktop app can send a pasted screenshot to Anthropic’s API for text extraction, using an Anthropic API key already on the device and never MoorAI; and an opt-in model second opinion can send the text of an ambiguous scan to Anthropic’s API the same way.

Does Noma Security publish a detection benchmark, and does MoorAI?

As of 2026 we could find no published detection accuracy, recall, precision or third-party benchmark from Noma; its material describes capabilities and customer outcomes, not an efficacy number. MoorAI publishes its marginal value (what it catches that the deployed assistant would not have refused on its own) against a public Apache-2.0 corpus, the Agentic Security Benchmark, graded to AMTSO's product-testing guidelines on a locked held-out split. On the current held-out cut the deployed assistant stops 36 of 44 attacks on its own; of the 8 it misses, MoorAI catches 6, and 2 get past both layers. Those runs are self-run by the maintainer, who also authors MoorAI (the results say so), and no third-party lab has reproduced them. AMTSO has not reviewed or endorsed MoorAI or the benchmark.

MoorAI vs Noma Security, full comparison →
Salt Code

How is MoorAI different from Salt Code?

Salt Code is a remote, hosted MCP server. Per Salt's own public repo, its manifest declares transport http against https://salt-code.secured-api.com/mcp with bearer authentication. What it returns is security-policy guidance text for the model to read while it writes code; it improves the code an agent authors. It cannot block anything: its install is a config paste plus a rules file asking the assistant to call the Salt Code MCP tools before writing API code. MoorAI governs what an agent does rather than what it writes: a PreToolUse hook and an on-device MCP stdio gateway that see which tool is about to run with which arguments and can block it before it executes, independent of whether the model chooses to cooperate.

Both MoorAI and Salt Code talk about MCP security. Are they the same thing?

No. They mean opposite things, and this is the most important distinction in this comparison. Salt Code's MCP Security pack is guidance for authoring MCP servers and tools securely: prompt injection via MCP tools, tool poisoning, excessive tool permissions, insecure MCP server configurations. It is advice returned as text at authoring time. MoorAI's MCP work intercepts live tool calls at runtime over stdio and blocks them: server allow-listing, per-tool argument rules, block before execution. Salt Code cannot see or stop a single MCP call at runtime; it is itself another MCP server in the agent's list.

Is Salt Code fail-open?

By design, yes, and Salt documents it. The rules file its install ships instructs the assistant, when the Salt Code MCP server is not connected, to tell the user: "I'll continue without it, but I won't be able to apply Salt Code's security policies to the code I generate." Coverage depends on the server being reachable and on the model choosing to consult it. MoorAI's enforcement point is local and does not depend on model cooperation or on a network round-trip.

Where does Salt Code cover more ground than MoorAI?

On the code the agent writes, by a wide margin. Salt Code brings OWASP API Security Top 10 design guidance (BOLA, broken authentication, mass assignment, query-string auth, PII in URLs), plus OpenAPI and Swagger spec compliance, and its enterprise tier announces CI/CD and PR-gate enforcement with Jira and ServiceNow routing. It lists sixteen tested coding-assistant integrations against MoorAI's small set of wrapped CLIs, it reaches cloud builders such as Lovable and Bolt where there is no developer machine at all, and it installs with no endpoint agent, using one config paste. MoorAI has no opinion on whether a generated endpoint has a BOLA flaw.

Is this the same comparison as MoorAI vs Salt Security?

No. Salt sells two different things. The Agentic Security Graph is the enterprise API-security platform, and that comparison is architecture-level and spatial: gateway versus endpoint. Salt Code is a different category with a different buyer: a developer who plugs a remote MCP server into their coding assistant. moorai.dev/moorai-vs-salt-code.html compares Salt Code. The Agentic Security Graph comparison lives at moorai.dev/moorai-vs-salt.html.

MoorAI vs Salt Code, full comparison →
Snyk

How is MoorAI different from Snyk?

Snyk is a broad developer-security platform: Snyk Open Source (SCA over dependencies), Snyk Code (SAST), Snyk Container and Snyk IaC, integrated into the IDE, CLI, pull request and CI/CD. MoorAI governs a different layer: the coding agent's own tool calls (Bash, Read, Write, local MCP), evaluated on the developer's machine before they run, content-free by default. Snyk scans the artifact (the code, dependency, container or template); MoorAI gates the agent's live action.

Does MoorAI scan code or dependencies for vulnerabilities like Snyk?

No. MoorAI does not perform SCA, SAST, container or IaC scanning, and has no vulnerability database. It intercepts the coding agent's tool calls locally and evaluates them against a 85-threat matrix on the device, emitting only a category, a risk level and a keyed one-way hash (plus the login and hostname, which the console pseudonymises on arrival). For finding vulnerabilities in code, dependencies, containers or infrastructure-as-code, Snyk is the right tool; MoorAI governs the agent's runtime actions, including the ones that never produce a scannable artifact or cross the network.

Do MoorAI and Snyk compete?

They are complementary: two layers of the same AI-coding workflow. Snyk secures the artifacts an agent helps produce: code, dependencies, containers and IaC, gated in the IDE, PR and pipeline. MoorAI secures the agent's own actions on the device (the local Bash, Read and stdio MCP calls that never produce an artifact), content-free and open source (MIT). Use Snyk for application security and MoorAI where a coding agent's tool call must be governed in-process with prompt content kept on the machine.

MoorAI vs Snyk, full comparison →
Socket

How is MoorAI different from Socket?

Socket is a software supply-chain security product: it analyses the open-source packages your code pulls in (npm, PyPI and other ecosystems), flags dependency risk, reviews new dependencies on pull requests, and can block a known-malicious package at install time. MoorAI governs a different layer: the coding agent's own tool calls (Bash, Read, Write, local MCP), evaluated on the developer's machine before they run, content-free by default. Socket asks whether a package is safe to install; MoorAI asks whether the agent's action is safe to take.

Does MoorAI scan dependencies or packages like Socket?

No. MoorAI does not analyse packages, scan a dependency graph, or maintain supply-chain threat intelligence. It intercepts the coding agent's tool calls locally and evaluates them against a 85-threat matrix on the device, emitting only a category, a risk level and a keyed one-way hash (plus the login and hostname, which the console pseudonymises on arrival). For keeping malicious or risky dependencies out of the codebase, Socket is the right tool; MoorAI governs the agent's runtime actions, including the ones that never fetch a package or cross the network.

Do MoorAI and Socket compete?

They are complementary: they govern two layers of the same AI-coding workflow. Socket secures the dependency graph: the packages an agent pulls in, gated at the registry, the PR and install time. MoorAI secures the agent's own actions on the device (the local Bash, Read and stdio MCP calls that never fetch a package), content-free and open source (MIT). Use Socket for supply-chain risk and MoorAI where a coding agent's tool call must be governed in-process with prompt content kept on the machine.

MoorAI vs Socket, full comparison →
Sonatype

How is MoorAI different from Sonatype?

Sonatype is a software supply-chain platform built around the artifact repository: Nexus Repository stores and proxies build components, Repository Firewall quarantines risky or malicious open-source components before they enter the repository, Lifecycle applies open-source governance and policy, and it manages SBOMs at scale. MoorAI governs a different layer: the coding agent's own tool calls (Bash, Read, Write, local MCP), evaluated on the developer's machine before they run, content-free by default. Sonatype governs components entering the build; MoorAI gates the agent's live action.

Does MoorAI manage a repository or govern components like Sonatype?

No. MoorAI does not manage an artifact repository, quarantine components, maintain component intelligence, or generate SBOMs. It intercepts the coding agent's tool calls locally and evaluates them against a 85-threat matrix on the device, emitting only a category, a risk level and a keyed one-way hash (plus the login and hostname, which the console pseudonymises on arrival). For governing the open-source components that enter your builds, Sonatype is the right tool; MoorAI governs the agent's runtime actions, including the ones that never fetch a component or cross the network.

Do MoorAI and Sonatype compete?

They are complementary: two layers of the same AI-coding workflow. Sonatype governs the component supply chain: the artifact repository, the firewall that quarantines bad components, and the SBOM. MoorAI governs the agent's own actions on the device (the local Bash, Read and stdio MCP calls that never fetch a component), content-free and open source (MIT). Use Sonatype for supply-chain and component governance, and MoorAI where a coding agent's tool call must be governed in-process with prompt content kept on the machine.

MoorAI vs Sonatype, full comparison →
Sunglasses

How is MoorAI different from Sunglasses?

Sunglasses is an input firewall: it scans what goes into an agent before the model sees it, across text, code, images (OCR and EXIF), PDFs, audio and video (via transcription) and QR codes, matching 1,546 patterns across 118 categories, entirely on the device with no cloud or telemetry. Its README says output scanning is planned for v0.5 and later; today it is input only. MoorAI enforces across the whole span (prompt, file, output, index, session and tool), so it also reviews the model's response and decides the tool call itself at the action boundary (allow, ask or deny), stopping the action even after a jailbreak has already succeeded. In one measured run, 12 of 12 malicious tool calls were stopped at the action layer under an enforcing policy on Claude Code. MoorAI also emits content-free evidence (category, risk and a keyed one-way hash) to a SIEM for a central audit trail. As of September 2026.

Where does Sunglasses cover more ground than MoorAI?

In three places. First, multimodal input: Sunglasses scans images with OCR and EXIF, PDFs, audio and video through transcription, and QR codes; MoorAI does on-device image OCR and scans the text fields of EXIF, XMP, ID3 and PDF metadata in files an agent reads, but does not match audio, video or QR codes. Second, openness: both agents are MIT-licensed, but Sunglasses is fully open source while MoorAI is open-core: an MIT agent plus a separate managed console, source-available under the Elastic License 2.0. Third, low-friction developer adoption: Sunglasses ships as a pip-installable Python library, a GitHub Action for pull-request scanning and a browser demo, and publishes a larger pattern library. Sunglasses reports its own metrics: 97.4% recall, 86.1% precision and 0 false positives on a clean-code regression corpus, and roughly 0.7ms on short inputs.

Is MoorAI more open than Sunglasses?

No. Sunglasses is more open. Both projects relicensed to MIT, so on the agent the license is at parity. Sunglasses is fully open source with no proprietary component. MoorAI is open-core: the agent is MIT and readable, but the central policy, posture and compliance console is a separate enterprise layer, source-available under the Elastic License 2.0 rather than open source. Where MoorAI's model differs is what leaves the device for enterprise evidence: Sunglasses keeps content local and uploads nothing, which is a strong local guarantee but not a central audit trail; MoorAI emits only category, risk and a keyed one-way hash to a SIEM, which is built for content-free central evidence. Neither uploads prompt content.

MoorAI vs Sunglasses, full comparison →
Zscaler

How is MoorAI different from Zscaler?

Zscaler is an enterprise SASE/SSE platform (the Zero Trust Exchange) that governs an organization's GenAI use by inspecting traffic inline in the network path. Its AI Guard applies DLP and prompt/response detectors to SaaS GenAI apps like ChatGPT, Gemini and Microsoft Copilot as traffic crosses the platform. MoorAI is narrower: it reviews the tool calls a coding agent makes locally, on the developer's machine, before anything is sent, so prompt content never reaches a gateway. The difference is scope and architecture: a broad inline platform versus an on-device coding-agent guardrail.

Does MoorAI inspect GenAI prompts inline like Zscaler AI Guard?

No. MoorAI evaluates the tool call on the device, before it executes, and by default prompt content never leaves the machine. Security teams receive only redacted, content-free signals (a category, a risk level and a keyed one-way hash, plus the login and hostname, which the console pseudonymises on arrival), never the prompts. Zscaler's model steers traffic to the Zero Trust Exchange and inspects the content in transit with DLP and 18+ prompt/response detectors. That covers what crosses the network; it does not see a coding agent's local tool calls that never egress.

Do MoorAI and Zscaler compete?

They are more complementary than competitive. Zscaler is built for organization-wide GenAI governance at the network edge: sanctioned-vs-unsanctioned app control, inline DLP, and access policy across the whole fleet. MoorAI governs what AI agents do at runtime, deepest on the coding agents developers run, on the device, content-free, and is open source (MIT). Use MoorAI where a coding agent's local Bash, Read and MCP tool calls have to be governed in-process, and where keeping prompt content on the machine is a hard requirement.

MoorAI vs Zscaler, full comparison →
AIR

How is MoorAI different from AIR?

AIR Security is a context firewall for an organization’s agents on endpoints, SaaS and cloud. It filters the skills, plugins, MCP servers, websites and data that reach them. MoorAI runs on the developer’s machine, inside the coding agent and in front of its MCP servers. It inspects content locally and sends only a category, a risk level and a keyed one-way hash (plus the login and hostname, which the console pseudonymises on arrival).

Does MoorAI cover SaaS agents like Slack the way AIR does?

No. MoorAI covers AI coding agents on macOS, Windows and Linux developer machines, plus a browser extension for eight chat apps on the same device, and the agent services, MCP servers and model calls routed through its sidecar, MCP gateway and model proxy. AIR lists Slack, Salesforce, ServiceNow and other SaaS agents, and cloud agents on Bedrock, Vertex AI and Azure AI Foundry.

Do MoorAI and AIR both vet skills and MCP servers?

Yes. AIR Filter vets add-ons before install and again after updates, and AIR Marketplace supplies pre-vetted add-ons. MoorAI runs a static pre-install scan that never executes the skill, plus an MCP allow-list with approval gating, rug-pull drift detection, rules-file integrity checks and slopsquat rules.

MoorAI vs AIR, full comparison →
Pluto Security

How is MoorAI different from Pluto Security?

Pluto is a platform that maps the AI tools people use across endpoints and SaaS, then scores them and enforces policy. MoorAI runs inside the coding agent and decides each tool call on the device. Only a category, a risk level and a keyed hash (plus the login and hostname, which the console pseudonymises on arrival) leave the machine.

Does Pluto cover tools that MoorAI does not?

Yes. Pluto lists app builders and automation platforms such as Lovable, n8n, Replit and Retool, and pulls in Claude Enterprise activity through Anthropic’s Compliance API (in Private Preview). MoorAI covers AI coding agents on macOS, Windows and Linux, plus the agent services you run yourself through its sidecar, MCP gateway and model proxy, and does not cover SaaS-hosted agents.

Can MoorAI and Pluto Security be used together?

Yes. Pluto gives organization-wide visibility into what employees build with AI. MoorAI adds a decision on each tool call on developer machines, and its audit record holds no prompt content.

MoorAI vs Pluto Security, full comparison →
Runlayer

How is MoorAI different from Runlayer?

Both hook into coding agents and block risky tool calls before they run. Runlayer sends tool-call content to its platform, hosted or self-hosted, where its models scan it and Sessions record it. MoorAI inspects on the device and sends only a category, a risk level and a keyed one-way hash (plus the login and hostname, which the console pseudonymises on arrival).

Does MoorAI replace Runlayer’s MCP gateway?

No. Runlayer governs the path from agents to company systems: an MCP catalog, identity- and OAuth-scoped access, an OAuth broker, an LLM gateway with spend budgets, and hosting for internal MCP servers and agents. MoorAI runs a local stdio MCP gateway on the developer’s machine, so the two can run side by side.

Which one enforces in more coding agents?

Runlayer. Its docs list hook enforcement for Claude Code, Cursor, VS Code, Copilot CLI, Gemini CLI, Codex, Windsurf, Goose and others. MoorAI's enforcement is validated end to end on Claude Code; its Codex, Copilot CLI, Gemini CLI and Cursor adapters block through each agent's pre-tool hook but are not yet validated against the live agents.

MoorAI vs Runlayer, full comparison →
Uber ADR (open source)

How is MoorAI different from Uber ADR?

ADR is an open-source project from Uber, not a vendor product. Its sensor parses the logs of 11 AI agents after the fact, on an hourly schedule in Uber’s deployment, and its detector reviews each session with a triage model and, for suspicious sessions, a reasoning agent. Its prevention component is not in the open-source release. MoorAI decides before each tool call runs, on the device and without a model call by default, and sends the console no prompt content.

Where does Uber ADR cover more ground than MoorAI?

In reach and hindsight. ADR reads 11 agents’ logs with no hook in any of them, including sessions from before it was installed, inventories AI tooling with a ledger of what it could not see, and reasons over a whole session with a language model. Everything it releases is Apache-2.0, and it is backed by an MLSys 2026 paper and a deployment of more than 7,200 hosts at Uber.

MoorAI vs Uber ADR, full comparison →
Microsoft Purview

How is MoorAI different from Microsoft Purview?

Purview governs your Microsoft 365 data: sensitivity labels, data loss prevention, retention, eDiscovery and oversharing assessments across Microsoft 365, Microsoft 365 Copilot, connected AI apps and onboarded endpoints. MoorAI governs what AI agents do: it checks the shell commands, file reads and MCP tool calls of coding agents on the device before they run, and the tool calls and model calls of the AI apps you build. They cover different ground, so run both.

Where does Microsoft Purview cover more ground than MoorAI?

Everything about the Microsoft 365 data itself. Purview labels and classifies Microsoft 365 content, finds overshared SharePoint sites before Copilot surfaces them, keeps AI prompts and responses for retention and eDiscovery, runs endpoint DLP for USB, printing and network shares, and reaches Microsoft 365 Copilot, Copilot Studio, Foundry and third-party AI sites in the browser. MoorAI does none of that.

MoorAI vs Microsoft Purview, full comparison →
Google Cloud and Wiz

How is MoorAI different from Google Cloud and Wiz?

Google Cloud secures the agents you run on its agent platform: Agent Identity gives each agent a SPIFFE-based identity, Agent Gateway governs its traffic with access policies that deny by default, and Model Armor screens its prompts and responses. Wiz maps AI workloads and attack paths across clouds and scans AI-generated code. MoorAI checks what agents do where they act: the shell commands, file reads and MCP tool calls of coding agents on the device before they run, and the tool calls and model calls of the agents you build. They enforce in different places, so run both.

Where do Google Cloud and Wiz cover more ground than MoorAI?

Everything about the agents and workloads in the cloud. Google Cloud gives each agent on Agent Runtime, Gemini Enterprise or Cloud Run a cryptographic identity, denies its connections through Agent Gateway until an access policy grants them, and screens prompts and responses with Model Armor. Wiz analyses AI attack paths across clouds, inventories AI frameworks, models and IDE extensions, and scans AI-generated code for vulnerable dependencies, IaC misconfigurations and container malware. MoorAI does none of that.

MoorAI vs Google Cloud and Wiz, full comparison →