MoorAI vs Cycode
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This comparison has changed. Cycode is a complete Application Security Posture Management (ASPM) platform (SAST, SCA, secrets detection, IaC, container and CI/CD security, and software supply-chain governance) that has moved hard into AI. It calls itself “The Agentic Development Security Platform,” and its pitch is blunt: “AI Writes The Code. We Secure And Govern It.” (cycode.com) That means two things at once: it scans the code an agent produces the way it has always scanned code, and it adds AI Guardrails that hook the IDE and agent directly.
Those guardrails are shipping product. Cycode intercepts at three points inside the agent (before a prompt is submitted, before a file is read, and before an MCP tool call executes), blocking secrets before they leave the machine. It ships an AIBOM inventory of the agents, models and MCP servers in use, discovers shadow AI, and can “Block Unauthorized MCPs.” (cycode.com) On the AI-agent governance layer, MoorAI and Cycode overlap.
MoorAI is the narrow, open half of that overlap. It is an open-source (MIT), standalone, content-free runtime governor for the coding agent’s actions: a PreToolUse hook in the agent and an MCP stdio proxy in front of the tool servers, running a 85-threat detection matrix on the device, emitting only category · risk · keyed one-way hash (plus the login and hostname, which the console pseudonymises on arrival) — never prompt content. It does not scan your repositories, your pipelines, or the code the agent writes. It watches what the agent does, decides before the action runs, and leaves a signed record that contains no one’s content.
The split is scope and posture; the mechanism is similar. Cycode is a platform that secures the whole software factory and treats the IDE as its newest boundary — in its words, “The IDE and CLI are now a security boundary.” (cycode.com/adlc-security) MoorAI is one small, auditable agent that governs runtime agency and proves it took no content off the box. The section where Cycode covers ground MoorAI does not attempt is below, and it is the longer one.
Where MoorAI goes deeper
Both hook the agent, but they keep different records and chase different threats. Cycode’s guardrails are secret- and policy-centric (stop a credential before it leaves), and its logging is built for security-team visibility. MoorAI’s edge is a content-free evidence architecture and an agent-native threat model that goes past secrets: the tool call itself, the output, the skill file, the transit path.
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| MoorAI | Cycode | |
|---|---|---|
| No content-bearing telemetry, by architecture — verifiable in source | ✓ | ✗ |
| Only category · risk · keyed one-way hash (plus login and hostname, pseudonymised on arrival) leave the device | ✓ | ✗ |
| 85-threat agent detection matrix (beyond secrets) | ✓ | ◐ |
| Reviews AI output, not just prompts, files and tool arguments | ✓ | ✗ |
| Per-tool MCP argument rules (arbitrary allow/deny, not only secret payloads) | ✓ | ◐ |
| Content-free Skill Analysis (skill / rules-file intent, not secret scanning) | ✓ | — |
| On-device OCR — image inspection never leaves the device | ✓ | — |
| On-device browser GenAI interception — 8 chat apps (ChatGPT, Claude, Gemini, Copilot…), beyond the IDE / CLI | ✓ | — |
| On-device model escalation on ambiguity — opt-in, content-free second opinion (default off) | ◐ | — |
| Signed-installer MDM fleet rollout (Intune + Jamf .mobileconfig) | ✓ | — |
| Lethal-trifecta / cross-server toxic-flow detection | ✓ | — |
| Shadow-AI discovery on the endpoint — unsanctioned models, MCP servers and editor AI extensions vs an allow-list | ✓ | ◐ |
| Content-free data lineage / Event Flow | ✓ | ✗ |
| in-toto/SLSA attestation of the agent’s action chain — provenance of what the agent did, content-free | ✓ | — |
| Cryptographically signed, tamper-evident decisions | ✓ | — |
| JIT elevation + entitlement envelope | ✓ | — |
| Per-agent assurance score | ✓ | — |
| Break-glass / offline fail-closed | ✓ | ◐ |
| Natural-language policy authoring | ✓ | — |
| AI compliance packs mapped to content-free evidence (OWASP LLM Top 10 + Agentic Top 10 / NIST AI RMF / ISO 42001 / EU AI Act) | ✓ | ◐ |
| Open source (MIT) — the content-free claim is auditable | ✓ | ◐ |
| Free to start — no account, no platform to stand up | ✓ | ✗ |
Where they overlap
Cycode’s AI-agent work is specific and shipped, so the table marks it present. It hooks the same agents MoorAI wraps (before a prompt, before a file read, before an MCP tool call), it allow-lists MCP servers, it discovers shadow AI, and it maintains a live AIBOM. On this layer the two products do the same category of thing.
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| MoorAI | Cycode | |
|---|---|---|
| Detection and enforcement run on the device, via IDE / agent hooks | ✓ | ✓ |
| Inspects prompts before they reach the model | ✓ | ✓ |
| Blocks the MCP tool call before it executes | ✓ | ✓ |
| MCP server allow-list — blocks unauthorized servers | ✓ | ✓ |
| Sensitive content blocked before it leaves the machine | ✓ | ✓ |
| Shadow-AI discovery | ✓ | ✓ |
| AIBOM — live agent / model / MCP inventory | ✓ | ✓ |
| Names the coding agents explicitly (Claude Code, Cursor) | ✓ | ✓ |
| Per-agent destination map — which model an agent reaches | ✓ | ✓ |
Where Cycode covers more ground
Most of Cycode’s product lives here. Cycode is an ASPM platform first and an AI-guardrail second. Its center of gravity is securing the whole software development lifecycle and the code the agent produces — a category MoorAI does not attempt and has no roadmap to. If the requirement is “one platform that scans our repos, pipelines and AI-written code and routes fixes into pull requests,” that is Cycode’s product and not ours.
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| MoorAI | Cycode | |
|---|---|---|
| SAST — static analysis of source code | ✗ | ✓ |
| SCA — open-source dependency / composition analysis | ✗ | ✓ |
| Secrets detection across repositories and git history | ◐ | ✓ |
| Infrastructure-as-Code security scanning | ✗ | ✓ |
| Container image security scanning | ✗ | ✓ |
| CI/CD pipeline security & runtime monitoring | ✗ | ✓ |
| Software supply-chain security / SSDF governance | ✗ | ✓ |
| Scans and secures the AI-generated code itself | ✗ | ✓ |
| PR-native remediation workflow — auto-fixes routed into pull requests | ✗ | ✓ |
| Source-code leakage detection | ✗ | ✓ |
| SBOM generation | ✗ | ✓ |
| Unified ASPM risk graph across the whole SDLC | ✗ | ✓ |
Two marks that need context. On secrets detection we mark MoorAI partial, not absent: MoorAI detects credential-shaped content in an agent’s action at runtime, but it does not scan repositories or git history the way Cycode does; that is a codebase job, and it is Cycode’s. On no content-bearing telemetry we do not accuse Cycode of exfiltration: Cycode says the secret value itself is redacted before it reaches the model, and we take that claim at face value. The row is narrower and testable — no content-bearing telemetry, by architecture, verifiable in source. MoorAI is MIT and emits only category · risk · keyed one-way hash (plus the login and hostname, which the console pseudonymises on arrival), so anyone can read the code and confirm there is no content path off the device. Cycode’s platform is proprietary (its CLI, which installs the guardrail hooks, is MIT, but the checks run in the Cycode tenant) and logs interaction events to a centralized dashboard for security-team visibility, so the guarantee cannot be checked either way — that is what the ✗ marks, not an allegation.
Where MoorAI is stronger. The record, and the reach past secrets. Cycode’s guardrails are built around credentials and policy: block the secret before it leaves. That is useful. MoorAI’s threat model is wider: a 85-threat matrix that sees the destructive shell command, the lethal-trifecta flow, the poisoned skill file, the overridden transit path. Its evidence is content-free by construction: a signed, tamper-evident decision carrying no prompt content at all, mapped to ISO 42001, NIST AI RMF, the EU AI Act, and both the OWASP LLM Top 10 and the OWASP Agentic Top 10 (ASI01–ASI10). MoorAI also ships its own bill of materials for the agent, not just the code it wrote: a CycloneDX/SPDX AIBOM of the models, MCP servers, tools and skills in play, plus in-toto/SLSA attestation of the action chain — a record of what the agent is and did, complementary to Cycode’s SBOM of what shipped. When the artifact an auditor reads must contain no one’s content, and the reviewer must be able to prove that from source, that is MoorAI’s ground.
Where Cycode is stronger. Breadth, and the codebase. One platform doing SAST, SCA, secrets, IaC, containers, CI/CD and supply-chain, then scanning the code the agent writes and routing fixes into pull requests, is a real procurement argument MoorAI has no answer to. MoorAI does not scan a repository, does not open a PR. It runs across macOS, Windows and Linux (Linux OCR opportunistic, not first-class) with Intune and Jamf fleet rollout, and it stays a single-purpose runtime governor. Cycode’s AI security sits inside an enterprise ASPM platform with an established AppSec buyer; MoorAI’s community agent is free and open source. Those are different purchases for different problems.
Where each fits. They are more complementary than competitive. Run Cycode if you want one platform securing the whole software factory (repositories, pipelines, dependencies and the AI-written code), with remediation that lands in pull requests. Run MoorAI where developers run coding agents with terminal and filesystem access, where you need the agent’s runtime actions and the MCP layer governed at call time, and where the evidence an auditor reads must contain no one’s prompt content at all — and be provable from open source.
Cycode capabilities are mapped from Cycode’s own published product, AI-security and blog pages as of 2026; quoted phrases are theirs. ◐ = partial — present but narrower than the other column. — = unconfirmed, not necessarily absent: it marks a capability their published material does not clearly document. MoorAI marks reflect shipped capability. Cycode and Cycode AI Guardrails are trademarks of their respective owner; this is an independent capability comparison, not an endorsement, and every product here evolves — verify specifics against their current documentation.