MoorAI vs Akto
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Akto and MoorAI hook the same coding agents in the same places. They differ in what leaves the machine and in how much else each covers. Akto describes its endpoint product this way: “Akto Atlas secures the AI agents, MCP servers, and GenAI tools your employees actually use: IDEs, CLIs, browsers, and local dev environments.” (Akto docs, Atlas overview) In Claude Code it uses the native hooks: “It intercepts prompts before sending to Claude, MCP tool calls before they execute, and responses after generation.” (Akto docs, Claude CLI Hooks) MoorAI is a PreToolUse hook inside the coding agent and a Model Context Protocol (MCP) stdio proxy in front of the tool servers. It reads the prompt, the file read into context, the shell command and the MCP arguments and results, and coaches, masks or blocks on what it finds.
Both block before a tool runs and both can redact instead of block. Akto’s PreToolUse script “Validates every tool call before it runs.” (Akto docs, Claude CLI Hooks) The difference is the record. Akto reports to a central dashboard: “Every decision is reported back to the Akto dashboard for monitoring and audit.” (Akto docs, Atlas Guardrails) Its pricing page lists a module that “Logs every prompt, response, violation and skill call as a forensic audit trail.” (akto.io/pricing) MoorAI decides against a 77-threat matrix and by default sends only category · risk · keyed one-way hash.
Akto covers more ground than MoorAI does. It hooks more agents, reaches desktop apps without hooks through a system proxy, covers browsers through extensions, inventories the credentials agent tools create, scans agent settings for weakened configurations, and comes from an API security and red-teaming background. MoorAI governs coding agents and their MCP traffic. The rows where Akto covers more ground are further down.
Three things this page does not state. (1) Exactly where Akto’s verdict is computed. Its guardrails page says “You define policies centrally in Akto, and they are evaluated locally on each device, so risky prompts and tool calls are stopped at the source.” (Akto docs, Atlas Guardrails) Its Claude Code hook scripts, published on Akto’s GitHub, post each call to the Akto instance URL set at install and read the verdict from the reply, logging “AKTO_DATA_INGESTION_URL not set, allowing request (fail-open)” when none is set. (github.com/akto-api-security/akto) We read the two together and mark the row unconfirmed. (2) Prices. Akto states “usage based Enterprise-grade pricing” (akto.io/pricing) and publishes no figures. (3) Akto’s blog posts beyond the two we read (Claude Code guardrails and the seed announcement); its gated datasheets were not opened. Every Akto statement below is quoted from Akto’s own site, docs or GitHub, and the source is named.
The core difference is what reaches the dashboard: the prompt and the tool call, or a content-free record of the verdict.
claude -p in CI or an Agent SDK service in a container, MoorAI’s server mode runs the same hook.Where MoorAI holds ground Akto does not
These rows follow from sending no content off the machine, and from coding-agent detectors Akto does not describe. Akto marks are unconfirmed where its public material is silent.
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| MoorAI | Akto | |
|---|---|---|
| By default only category · risk · keyed one-way hash leave the device | ✓capture tiers are opt-in, admin-enabled | ✗prompts and MCP calls reported to the Akto instance |
| Coding-agent verdict computed on the device, with nothing sent anywhere to decide | ✓ | —guardrails page says local; Claude Code hook posts to the Akto instance |
| Gates package installs against typosquatted and hallucinated names | ✓slopsquatting firewall | —not in public material |
| Flags a proxy plus CA override that reroutes the agent’s traffic | ✓transit-override detection | — |
| Flags an agent pointed at a model endpoint that is not on the allow-list | ✓model-endpoint allow-list | —host blocklist for agent traffic; model endpoints not named |
| Reports the agent’s rules files leaving the device, by fingerprint | ✓ | — |
| Flags a risky action aimed at something the user’s request never named | ✓intent alignment; lexical, keyed hashes | — |
| Scans the local files an MCP call names, as if the agent had read them | ✓hook and stdio proxy | — |
| Coaches on a device that is not enrolled, and never blocks there | ✓ | —observation mode is set per install |
| Free to start and to enforce, without talking to sales | ✓agent free; console free to 200 users | ✗usage-based enterprise pricing, no public figures |
Where Akto covers ground MoorAI does not
This list is longer. Akto covers employee AI use across agents, desktop apps, browsers and homegrown agents, on top of an API security product. MoorAI covers coding agents and their MCP traffic.
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| MoorAI | Akto | |
|---|---|---|
| Hooks for Kiro, Hermes, Amp, Antigravity, Neovim, OpenCode and more | ✗Claude Code, Codex CLI, Copilot CLI, Gemini CLI, Cursor | ✓ |
| Desktop apps that expose no hooks, through a system proxy | ◐Claude Desktop's MCP servers through the stdio proxy | ✓ |
| Browser AI through extensions for Chrome, Firefox and Safari, including personal-account sign-ins | ✗ | ✓ |
| Wraps remote (HTTP) MCP servers as well as local ones | ◐hook sees every MCP call in the agent; proxy is stdio only | ✓ |
| Inventory of the keys and tokens agent tools create, with expiry and rotation policies | ◐exposure ledger by credential class; no expiry or rotation | ✓ |
| Fleet-wide scan of agent settings for skipped approval, sandbox off or hooks disabled | ◐moorai-doctor checks hooks and disableAllHooks on one device | ✓ |
| Time-boxed approval of an actor after a block | ✗sign-off per action; MCP servers approved in the console | ✓ |
| Guardrails across a whole session, for slow exfiltration over many turns | ✗ | ✓ |
| Content-policy scanners such as toxicity, bias and banned topics | ✗ | ✓ |
| Agentic red teaming and API security testing | ✗ | ✓ |
Same capability, different mechanism
Both products do each of these, so the table describes how rather than scoring.
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| MoorAI does it by… | Akto does it by… | |
|---|---|---|
| Stopping a coding agent’s action before it runs | A PreToolUse hook in the agent’s own process, validated end to end on Claude Code. Codex CLI, Copilot CLI, Gemini CLI and Cursor block through their own pre-tool hooks and are not yet validated against the live agents. An MCP stdio proxy enforces for any host that launches a stdio MCP server. | The same native hooks, installed by script into ~/.claude/hooks or by the Endpoint Shield. In Claude Code, PreToolUse is “The only hook that can block a tool call”; PostToolUse and Stop observe or check responses. (Akto docs, Claude CLI Hooks) |
| Guarding MCP traffic | The hook scans every mcp__ call and result in Claude Code, and the stdio proxy scans arguments and results for any host, with an approval lifecycle and rug-pull re-pending for servers. |
The Endpoint Shield, “wrapping local (STDIO) and remote (HTTP) MCP servers with runtime security.” (Akto docs, AI Endpoint Shield) |
| Redacting instead of blocking | The mask action rewrites a secret or PII span to [MOORAI:<tier>:<8 letters>], derived from the keyed hash, and lets the call proceed. Built from Claude Code’s hooks reference and not yet observed in a live session. |
Redaction guardrails that, per Akto’s scanner reference, “Allows the request through after redaction, rather than blocking it.” (Akto docs, Agent Guard) |
| Code you can read | The agent is MIT, so what it sends can be checked in code; the console is source-available under the Elastic License 2.0. | The Claude Code hook scripts are fetched from Akto’s public GitHub repository, which GitHub lists as MIT. The guardrail service they call is not part of what we read. |
| Discovering agents on devices | An on-device AI bill of materials: models, MCP servers, editor extensions, running local model servers and AI keys at rest, checked against your allow-list. | The Endpoint Shield, which “Discovers every AI agent, MCP server, skill, and plugin present on the device,” (Akto docs, AI Endpoint Shield) plus EDR and device-management connectors. |
MITRE ATLAS, as documented. In our reading of vendor material against the 76 ATLAS techniques tagged Agentic AI, Akto’s published material documents 21 of the 76 (read 1 October 2026), 12 of them with a limit the vendor states. Most cells come from Akto’s public scanner reference, which names what each guardrail catches; a pricing-page line claiming full coverage of MITRE ATLAS threats names no technique and is not counted. That counts what the documentation says, not a test of the product. The method and every quote behind the number are in What vendors actually document against MITRE ATLAS.
Where MoorAI is stronger. Coding-agent depth with no content leaving the machine. The verdict is reached on the device. Package installs, proxy overrides, model endpoints, rules-file leaks, actions aimed outside the user’s request and the files an MCP call names are each checked there, and the console receives no prompt and no tool argument. The agent is MIT, an unenrolled device coaches rather than blocks, and enforcement is free up to 200 users.
Where Akto is stronger. Breadth across employee AI use. More coding agents hooked, desktop apps without hooks covered through a system proxy, browsers through extensions, remote MCP servers wrapped, the credentials agent tools mint inventoried with expiry and rotation, agent settings scanned fleet-wide, approvals that expire, guardrails that read a whole session, content-policy scanners, red teaming, and a public scanner reference that names what each guardrail catches. If the job is one product for every place employees use AI, Akto covers more of it than MoorAI does.
Which to run where. Run Akto where the question is coverage across employee AI: browsers, desktop apps, many agents and homegrown agents, with prompts kept centrally for audit. Run MoorAI on developer machines and CI runners where the question is what a coding agent is about to read, run or send, and where prompts and source code should stay on the machine. Both register Claude Code hooks, so on one machine they would run side by side in the same hook events; nothing in either’s public material says they conflict, and we have not run them together.
Questions about MoorAI and Akto
Does Akto’s Claude Code hook check built-in tools like Bash and Read?
Yes, per Akto’s docs: its PreToolUse script validates every tool call before it runs, MCP or not. What is off by default is ingestion: built-in tool calls are not reported to the Akto dashboard unless an administrator sets AKTO_INGEST_NON_MCP_TOOLS to true. MoorAI’s hook covers Read, Bash, PowerShell, the write tools, WebFetch, sub-agents and MCP tools, and reports content-free alerts for all of them.
Does Akto decide on the device or in its service?
Akto’s guardrails page says policies are defined centrally and evaluated locally on each device, with every decision reported to the Akto dashboard. Its Claude Code hook scripts post each call to the Akto instance URL set at install, which can be Akto’s cloud or a self-hosted deployment. MoorAI reaches its verdict on the device and by default sends only a category, a risk level and a keyed one-way hash.
Which coding agents does Akto hook?
Akto lists Claude Code, Codex, Gemini, Copilot, Kiro, Hermes, Amp, Cursor, VS Code, Antigravity, Neovim and OpenCode among its connectors, plus a system proxy for desktop apps without hooks and browser extensions. MoorAI hooks Claude Code, validated end to end, and Codex CLI, Copilot CLI, Gemini CLI and Cursor, which are not yet validated against the live agents.
Does MoorAI replace Akto, or the other way round?
No. Akto covers employee AI use across agents, desktop apps, browsers and homegrown agents, with credential governance, red teaming and API security. MoorAI does none of that beyond coding agents. MoorAI inspects what a coding agent’s actions contain and coaches, masks or blocks on the device, with no content sent to a vendor.
Who backs Akto?
Akto’s own site announces a $4.5 million seed round led by Accel, with angel investors including Notion co-founder and COO Akshay Kothari, Tenable co-founder Renaud Deraison and Sentry CEO Milin Desai. We found no later round on Akto’s site.
Akto capabilities are taken from Akto’s own published material, checked on 1 October 2026: Akto for employees, akto.io/pricing, Akto Claude Code Security Guardrails, seed funding announcement, and the Akto docs pages Atlas overview, Atlas Guardrails, Claude CLI Hooks, AI Endpoint Shield, NHI Governance, Agent Guard, Misconfigurations, Session Guardrails and Human Approval, and the hook source in github.com/akto-api-security/akto. Every quoted phrase is Akto’s. ◐ = partial: present but narrower than the other column. — = unconfirmed, not necessarily absent. MoorAI marks reflect shipped capability: hook enforcement is validated end to end on Claude Code; Codex, Copilot CLI, Gemini CLI and Cursor block through their own pre-tool hooks and are not yet validated against the live agents. The agent is MIT and runs on macOS, Windows and Linux; the console is source-available under the Elastic License 2.0 and free up to 200 users. Akto is a trademark of its owner; this page is independent and is not affiliated with or endorsed by Akto. Both products change, so check specifics against current documentation.